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 Choosing Your Ethnicity: A Longitudinal Analysis of Ethnic 
Identity Choice and Intra-Individual Ethnicity Change 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies individuals’ possible choice to forgo their ancestral ethnicity and adopt a 
specific new ethnicity. We first use individual-level panel data for Indonesia as well as other 
countries (e.g., the U.S.) to document the pervasiveness of intra-individual ethnicity change 
and its coincidence with major life events, particularly, interethnic marriage. Next, we focus 
on individuals who have intermarried and exploit variation in deep-rooted community-level 
norms on matrilocality (co-residence with the wife’s family) to identify how differences in 
expected costs and benefits of ethnicity change causally affect newlyweds’ choice to adopt a 
specific ethnicity (i.e., their spouses’ ethnicity) or not. Results obtained using a three-wave 
panel comprising more than 13,000 Indonesians confirm the expected effect of matrilocality, 
as newly intermarried men (women) are significantly more (less) likely to adopt their 
spouses’ ethnicity when the couple lives in a matrilocal community compared to a non-
matrilocal one. Because ethnicity change is a means to fit in, important implication of our 
findings is that in many countries key statistics on ethnic fractionalization and segregation are 
severely inflated. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies individuals’ possible choice to forgo their original or ancestral ethnic 
identity and adopt a specific new ethnicity. Ethnic group membership has long been 
considered an important basis for discrimination and is linked to systematic group differences 
in key socioeconomic outcomes such as employment, wages, education, health, and credit 
access, but also in residential area, occupation, romantic partner choice and food preferences 
(Alesina et al. 2016; Atkin et al. 2019; Bisin and Verdier 2000; Chiswick 1988; Giuliano and 
Ransom 2013; Goldsmith et al. 2006; Hanna and Linden 2012; Hellerstein and Neumark 
2008; Mays et al. 2007; Petersen et al. 2019; Rubinstein and Brenner 2013). Underlying the 
large literature on ethnic segregation and discrimination is the conceptualization of 
individuals’ ethnicity as something unmalleable, a fixed personal trait that one inherits from 
one’s parents and that is often marked by phenotypical characteristics such as skin tone or 
hair color (Brubaker 2006; Wimmer 2013). Recent empirical analyses of longitudinal census 
data, however, provide strong evidence that people’s ethnic identity is not fixed and can 
change over the course of their lives. Although observed intra-individual variation in ethnic 
identity is at least partly explained by measurement error (Alba et al. 2016; Davenport 2020; 
Kramer et al. 2016), it appears that individuals are flexible and can identify as one ethnicity, 
say Black or African American, first and as another ethnicity, say White American, later on 
(Dahis et al. 2019; Liebler et al. 2017; Saperstein and Penner 2012). However, these analyses 
remain silent on individuals’ reasons for changing their ethnicity. 
We seek to understand intra-individual ethnicity change as the outcome of purposeful 
decision making on the part of the individual. Theoretically, we follow Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000) and, particularly, the long-standing socio-psychological literature on ethnic 
boundaries and acculturation (e.g., Barth 1969; Berry 1997; Waters 1990) to propose that 
changing one’s ethnic identity involves, among others, weighing the net benefits of retaining 
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one’s current ethnicity against potential net benefits of converting to another ethnicity. 
Empirically, we use longitudinal data to consider (i) individual factors predicting intra-
individual ethnic identity change, specifically so-called major life events (Cohen et al. 2019; 
Kanner et al. 1981), and (ii) plausibly exogenous contextual factors affecting the net benefits 
that individuals can expect to receive from adopting a specific ethnicity, specifically newly 
intermarried individuals conversion to the ethnicity of their spouse. We thereby follow the 
dominant understanding of ethnic identity in the social sciences, which is that individuals’ 
ethnicity involves a subjective feeling of groupness based on common ancestry that is the 
result of shared phenotypical traits, religious beliefs, region of origin and, particularly, shared 
language (Chandra 2006; Weber 1921; Wimmer 2013).1 
The main research context for this study is Indonesia, although we also present 
evidence showing that chief empirical observations of our study hold for the U.S. (intra-
individual changes in racial identity) and India (intra-individual changes in caste identity) as 
well. In Indonesia, intra-individual ethnicity change is not a strictly dichotomous 
phenomenon (you are either White or you are Black) but involves choosing among a rich set 
of alternative ethnicities. We can therefore consider two distinct forms of ethnicity change, 
making Indonesia the ideal research context for a longitudinal analysis of individuals’ ethnic 
identity. The first form is so-called generic or undirected ethnic identity change, which 
                                                 
1 The literature correspondingly speaks of ethnoracial groups, ethnoreligious groups, 
ethnoregional groups and ethnolinguistic groups (Wimmer 2013). Race is thus a form of 
ethnicity and a famous example of an ethnoracial group division is Blacks vs. Whites in the 
U.S. Well-known ethnoreligious groups include the division of Shia’s, Sunni’s, Maronites 
and Druzes in Lebanon. Worldwide, however, the most prominent ethnic divisions involve 
ethnolinguistic differences, particularly in Asia and Africa (Alesina et al. 2003; Easterly and 
Levine 1997). 
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involves forgoing one’s old ethnicity and adopting an unspecified new ethnic identity. The 
second is so-called directed ethnic identity change, which involves the choice of converting 
to a specific alternative ethnicity. For our empirical analyses, we follow the official practice 
of statistical agencies worldwide (Government of India 2011; Roth 2010; Statistics Indonesia 
2010; U.S. Bureau of the Census 2010) and measure ethnic identity mainly on the basis of 
self-reports. Obvious drawbacks of self-reported data notwithstanding, this ensures that our 
results match certified government statistics on ethnicity that, in turn, are grounded in the 
standard understanding of ethnicity as a subjective feeling of belonging (Weber 1921; 
Wimmer 2013). Still, evidence indicates that all the different indicators of individuals’ 
ethnicity that we consider—self-reported ethnicity, ethnic ancestry or descent, and ethnic 
language spoken—are associated with the prevalence of certain ethnicity-specific behaviors 
such as the eating of beef or the owning of pigs (see Tables A2.1-A2.3 in Appendix A). What 
is more, we find that changes in self-reported ethnicity are associated with significant 
behavioral adjustments, particularly speaking or learning the language of the individual’s new 
ethnic group. 
We divide our empirical analysis in two parts. In the first part, we present descriptive 
statistics and use regression analysis with an extensive set of control variables to document 
the pervasiveness of intra-individual ethnicity change in Indonesia. Longitudinal data from 
the Indonesian Family Life Survey or IFLS (Strauss et al. 2004, 2009, 2016) provides a three-
wave panel of 13,659 Indonesians followed over 14 years and enables us to make two main 
empirical observations (EOs). The first is that intra-individual ethnicity change is common in 
Indonesia and not limited to, say, specific socioeconomic classes, age cohorts or ethnic 
groups (EO1). On average, about 6.86% of all individuals in our sample change their ethnic 
identity from one wave to the next and churning occurs between all ethnicities: Javanese 
become Balinese, Balinese become Javanese, Sundanese become Batak, Batak become 
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Javanese et cetera. The second is that ethnic identity change exhibits structural patterns where 
intra-individual ethnicity change is more likely to occur coincidental with major life events, 
specifically interprovincial migration and interethnic marriage (EO2). Both EO1 and EO2 are 
robust to controlling for individual fixed effects, among others, and consistent with 
qualitative studies of ethnic group membership in Indonesia (Eilenberg and Reed, 2009; 
Hoon 2006; Sillander and Alexander 2016). 
In the second part of the empirical analysis we move from undirected ethnicity change 
to analyzing directed ethnicity change. We thereby focus on interethnic marriages, which 
often involve one spouse forgoing his/her ethnicity and adopting the ethnicity of the other 
spouse (cf. EO2). The dependent variable that we consider is a dummy variable for directed 
ethnicity change, specifically whether individuals who have intermarried have also converted 
to the ethnicity of their spouse. We call this phenomenon spousal ethnic adaptation and in 
our estimations we control for ethnic group and religious group fixed effects and a variety of 
community-level and time-varying individual-level variables. However, to identify how 
differences in expected costs and benefits causally affect newly intermarried individuals’ 
decision to convert to the ethnicity of their spouse we exploit variation in deep-rooted, 
community-specific cultural norms that affect how attractive it is for wives to adopt the 
ethnicity of their husbands and vice versa. 
Historically, some communities in Indonesia are matrilocal, which means that local 
cultural norms dictate that, after their marriage, couples co-reside with the brides’ (extended) 
family (Guilmoto 2015; Holden et al. 2003; Rammohan and Robertson 2012). We therefore 
expect that comparable individuals make different ethnicity choices because local post-
marital residence norms affect the relative attractiveness of newly intermarried wives 
retaining or newly intermarried husbands adopting a specific ethnicity, namely the ethnicity 
of the wife’s family. Empirical analysis renders strong support for this expected effect of 
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plausibly exogenous variation in the costs and benefits that newly intermarried men and 
women can expect from retaining or changing their ethnicity. Specifically, we find that newly 
intermarried men living in matrilocal communities are about 13 percentage points more likely 
to adopt the ethnicity of their wives than men living in non-matrilocal communities are 
(45.1% vs. 31.4%). Similarly, we find that newly intermarried women living in matrilocal 
communities are about 13 percentage points less likely to adopt the ethnicity of their 
husbands than women living in non-matrilocal communities are (41.2% vs. 55.1%).2 We 
conclude that intra-individual ethnicity change is not only systematic but also directional and 
causally affected by the expected costs and benefits of retaining one’s ethnicity vs. adopting a 
specific alternative ethnicity. 
This paper contributes to two bodies of research. The first is the emerging literature 
on ethnic identity choice in economics. Following Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) conceptual 
work on the costs and benefits of social identity and group membership, economists have 
recently started to study possible ethnicity choice empirically, notably in relation to 
government affirmative action. However, extant papers focus on dichotomous ethnicity 
choices of a limited number of ethnic groups, notably bi-ethnic individuals choosing between 
one of their ancestral ethnicities, and consider aggregate-level indicators of ethnic group 
membership based on repeated cross-sections. Antman and Duncan (2015), for example, 
consider the effect of a U.S. state-level ban on affirmative action (e.g., in government hiring), 
and find that the introduction of this ban reduced the proportion of individuals with mixed-
black and non-black ancestry that self-identified as Black as opposed to White by almost one-
third. Cassan (2015) focuses on the relative size of Indian castes and considers the opposite 
effect, finding that agricultural castes in India set to benefit from a 1901 land reform grew 
much faster in size compared to other castes that were not set to benefit from this reform. 
                                                 
2 To be sure, in Indonesia, all marriages are between a woman and a man. 
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Finally, Jia and Persson (2019) consider the effect of China’s one-child policy, which gives 
privileges to ethnic minorities (relative to the dominant ethnic Han), on the ethnicity chosen 
for children from Han/non-Han (majority/minority) couples. Their results indicate that the 
implementation of this policy led to a one-fifth increase in the percentage of mixed couples 
choosing a non-Han, minority ethnicity for their child. We thus advance the empirical 
literature on ethnic identity choice in three ways. The first is that our use of individual-level 
longitudinal data means that we consider actual intra-individual ethnicity change. The second 
is that in our analysis ethnicity change is not a dichotomous phenomenon but involves a 
much richer set of identity choices whereby individuals choose between a variety of 
alternative ethnicities. Finally, we expand the analysis of possible intra-individual ethnicity 
change to consider all individuals regardless of their ancestral ethnic background and not just 
individuals with mixed ethnic traits or multi-ethnic backgrounds.  
The second contribution is to the large literature on ethnic fractionalization and, 
particularly, ethnicity-based discrimination and segregation (Alesina et al. 2003, 2016; Arrow 
1973; Becker 1995; Bertrand et al. 2005; Ewens et al. 2014). Faced with persistent and 
sizeable ethnic segregation, many governments worldwide use ethnic group membership as a 
basis for directing policy making, for example, implementing affirmative action policies 
(Card and Krueger 2005; Cassan 2015; Guan 2005; Lim 1985). Moreover, with few 
exceptions, official statistics on various forms of ethnic segregation and integration are 
constructed from population censuses that measure ethnicity on the basis of individuals’ self-
reports (Government of India 2011; Roth 2010; Statistics Indonesia 2010; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census. 2013). The evidence on systematic intra-individual ethnicity change presented in this 
paper, however, raises questions about what we know (or what we think we know) about 
ethnic fractionalization and the size of various ethnic groups in society, the representation of 
these groups in different social positions, and the degree to which these groups are 
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intermingling or not. For instance, our results imply that marital homogamy in Indonesia is 
rather overstated. Taking cross-sectional data at face value, only 14.5% of all marriages in 
Indonesia are interethnic marriages. Correcting for intermarried individuals’ tendency to 
convert to their spouses’ ethnicity, in contrast, we find that this number understates 
intermarriage by almost one-third and that the actual prevalence of interethnic marriage is 
closer to 19.2%. More generally, the evidence on the permeability of ethnic group boundaries 
and the pervasiveness of intra-individual ethnicity change presented in this paper means that 
governments need to be careful when using self-reported ethnicity as a basis for public policy 
and serves as a warning against the reification of ethnic identity. 
The next section of this paper provides relevant background information, including 
details on some of the data and measures that we use, and makes two empirical observations 
on intra-individual ethnicity change. The section after that elaborates our empirical strategy 
for identifying causal drivers of individuals’ ethnic identity choice and presents the paper’s 
main empirical results. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and the importance of 
these findings, particularly for our understanding of ethnic segregation.  
 
II. RESEARCH CONTEXT, DATA, AND BACKGROUND 
II.A. Ethnic Identities in Indonesia 
Indonesia is known for its ethnic patchwork of approximately 300 officially recognized 
ethnic groups. Individuals’ ethnicity is thereby primarily based on fluency in the ethnic 
language and not on physical appearance (Musgrave 2014). Although most ethnic languages 
in Indonesia have some degree of resemblance with other Austronesian languages, the former 
differ significantly in terms of script, vocabulary and pronunciation, mostly because of 
historical variation in the degree of contact with outside groups (e.g., Arabs, Indians, Dutch, 
Japanese, Chinese and Malaysians). Some of the most prominent ethnicities in Indonesia are 
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Javanese, Sundanese, Batak and Madurese, accounting for 40.2%, 15.5%, 3.6% and 3.2% of 
the total population (Statistics Indonesia 2010).  
The importance of language as the defining feature of ethnic group membership 
means that, in Indonesian society, individuals’ choice for adopting a certain ethnicity is not 
heavily constrained by physical appearance, for instance, by being light-skinned vs. dark-
skinned. Moreover, the Indonesian national government is rather accommodative of intra-
individual ethnicity change. Individuals’ ethnicity is not determined at birth / by their parents 
but by the individual him-/herself: “The ethnicity of a household member is whatever he 
thinks it is” (Statistics Indonesia 2010). Members of ethnic groups tend to be geographically 
concentrated in Indonesia’s 34 provinces, however. The Sundanese, for instance, mostly live 
in West Java and Central Java, whereas the Balinese mostly live in Bali. With some 
exceptions, ethnic groups in Indonesia do not have a rank-ordered social position and are 
considered of equal status. Because of regional ethnic concentration, Javanese are the 
dominant ethnic group on Java but not on Bali, where the Balinese are the dominant ethnic 
group. Vice versa, the Balinese are the dominant ethnic group on Bali but not on Java. Hence, 
an ethnic group that is underprivileged and suffers socioeconomic exclusion in one province 
or geographic area in Indonesia may be the dominant ethnicity in another area. Overall, the 
lack of a universal rank-order for Indonesian ethnicities means that a change in ethnic self-
identification in Indonesia is not necessarily a matter of crossing group boundaries to seek 
acceptance by a high-status group. 
Finally, it is not uncommon for Indonesians to leave their region of birth and migrate 
to a different province or district within Indonesia. Sukamdi and Mujahid (2015), for 
example, report that between 2005 and 2010, 2.4% of the population of five years and older 
migrated between one of the 34 provinces of Indonesia. Lottum and Marks (2011) similarly 
find that more than 10% of Indonesians have migrated between provinces in Indonesia at one 
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point in their lives. Wajdi et al. (2017) estimate a gravity model of interregional migration in 
Indonesia finding that people mostly migrate towards developed regions, whereas geographic 
distance has a negative effect on migration flows between regions in Indonesia. 
 
II.B. Data and Measures 
Data for our analysis come from the Indonesian Family Life Survey or IFLS. Availability of 
specific variables means that we use the last three waves of this panel with data collected in 
2000 (Wave 3), 2007 (Wave 4) and 2014 (Wave 5) (Strauss et al. 2004, 2009, 2016). The 
IFLS contains an extensive set of variables concerning ethnicity, not only of respondents 
themselves but also of their parents and spouse, if applicable. In addition, much information 
is available on respondents’ communities. The IFLS data that we use comprise up to 13,659 
unique individuals and 27,008 observations overall, depending on whether we consider 
directed or undirected intra-individual ethnicity change. Throughout this paper, we only 
consider individuals included in all three waves. 
 
II.B.1. Measures of Ethnic Identity and Undirected Intra-Individual Ethnicity Change 
The key variable in our analysis concerns individuals’ ethnicity or ethnic identity. The main 
measure of ethnicity that we consider derives from the IFLS questionnaire item asking 
respondents to which ethnic group they belong (“What is your ethnicity?”). The 
accompanying answer scale distinguishes 29 ethnicities (see Table A1 in Appendix A for 
details). The survey allows individuals to select more than one ethnicity but very few 
respondents (<0.5%) do. We have removed these respondents from the sample for the main 
analysis but we obtain similar results when we do include these individuals. Across waves, 
the categories of possible answers to the ethnicity item have changed to cover different ethnic 
groups. Hence, we also exclude individuals reporting ethnicities that were not available as 
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possible answers in all three waves of the IFLS that we consider. Excluded answer categories 
include “Other,” “Cirebon” and “Banten.” Using the ethnicity item, we measure (undirected) 
intra-individual ethnicity change simply as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual’s 
self-reported ethnicity at time t is not the same as his/her ethnicity at time t-1 and equals 0 if 
the individual’s self-reported ethnicity at time t is the same as his/her ethnicity at time t-1. 
Further information on individuals’ ethnicity comes from the item asking respondents 
to indicate the ethnicity of their parents: “What is your father’s/mother’s ethnicity?” As 
before, the accompanying answer scale distinguishes 29 ethnicities (although this scale has 
also changed slightly across waves). Respondents can indicate different ethnicities for their 
mother and their father. We measure (undirected) intra-individual ethnicity change as a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if individuals’ self-reported ethnicity at time t is not the same 
as the reported ethnicity of both their father and their mother at time t and equals 0 otherwise.  
 
II.B.2. Other Measures and Control Variables 
For our purpose, two other variables included in the IFLS are particularly relevant. These 
variables concern the community in which individuals are living (a categorical variable) and 
the ethnicity of individuals’ spouses, if applicable (also a categorical variable). The latter 
variable derives from the item asking the respondents’ spouse “What is your ethnicity?,” 
although this question can also be answered by the respondent in case the spouse is absent 
during the interview. When estimating regression models using the IFLS data, we typically 
control for a large set of possible confounders. First, we include various time-varying 
individual-level control variables such as age, age squared, educational degree, employment 
status and an individual’s ability to speak the official national language “Bahasa Indonesia” 
(1=yes). Second, we control for community fixed effects and, if necessary, community-wave 
fixed effects and individual fixed effects. To make sure that our results are general and not 
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driven by systematic (dyadic) changes in ethnic identity (e.g., Balinese becoming Javanese), 
we further control for both ethnic group fixed effects and religious group fixed effects. 
Finally, because measurement error may be a factor (Alba et al. 2016; Davenport 2020; 
Kramer et al. 2016), we control for interviewers’ perceived accuracy of respondents’ answers 
and for interviewers’ own ethnicity and their prior experience interviewing for the IFLS. 
Table A1 in Appendix A presents details on these variables and their measurement. 
 
II.C. Theoretical Background 
Understanding intra-individual ethnicity change as the outcome of purposeful decision 
making on the part of the individual requires a framework that considers possible motives and 
corresponding benefits and costs of maintaining one’s current ethnic identity vs. adopting 
another ethnicity. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) consider individuals’ social identity, which 
includes their ethnic or racial identity, as an argument in their utility function. We extend 
Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) framework to incorporate the long-standing socio-
psychological literature on ethnic boundaries and ethnic identity formation (Barth 1969; 
Waters 1990), particularly Berry’s (1997) work on acculturation (see, also, e.g., Bourhis et al. 
1997). This refers to individuals undergoing social and psychological change to adapt or 
adjust to a particular socio-cultural environment. We generalize this idea of acculturation, 
which is most significant among international migrants, asylum seekers, and sojourners 
(Ward et al. 2005), to propose that individuals may use their social identity, particularly their 
ethnicity, as an instrument and change this identity as a means to fit in with a particular social 
environment. A concrete example involves forgoing one’s birth language to adopt the ethnic 
language spoken by most others with whom one meets or interacts regularly. Language is a 
key constituent of individuals’ ethnic identity (Brubaker 2006; Kertzer and Arel 2002; Weber 
1921; Wimmer 2013). However, language also has important economic ramifications for 
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individuals, as evidenced by many studies showing that adopting the language of the host 
country increases migrants’ labor market earnings (see Chiswick and Miller 2015 for a 
survey). In terms of Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) framework, we expect that individuals not 
only maximize their utility conditional on their ethnic identity but also choose the ethnic 
identity that maximizes their utility (cf. Shayo 2009). 
Individuals’ ethnic identity mostly derives from their cultural upbringing in a 
particular ethnic tradition, which is the result of their parents’ socialization efforts and ethnic 
ancestry (Erikson 1968; Pahl and Way 2006). Adopting another ethnicity therefore comes at 
the cost of renouncing one’s (genetic) ancestry and breaking with one’s childhood rearing. In 
addition, switching ethnic identities means leaving the comfort of one’s current ethnic group 
in favor of an ethnic group with which one tends to be less familiar. Being a member of a 
social group has generic psychological benefits (Abrams and Hogg 1988; Balliet et al. 2014; 
Bergami and Bagozzi 2000; Reynolds et al 2001), but also involves being part of a social 
network and being at the receiving end of ingroup favoritism. At the same time, as 
emphasized by the acculturation literature, individuals may change their ethnic identity 
precisely because being or becoming a member of a specific social group fosters social 
acceptance in a particular social environment (Hogg and Terry 2000; Hornsey 2008; Phinney 
2003; Sam and Berry 2010). In fact, when their social environment changes, individuals are 
likely to experience pressure from this new environment to assimilate (Bauer et al. 2000; 
Berry 1991; Rumbaut 1994), for instance, by changing their ethnic identity. Ethnicities are 
delineated by boundaries that are defined by, among others, shared language, religion and 
culture but also by phenotypical traits such as skin tone or hair color (Brubaker 2006; 
Wimmer 2013). Some of these ethnic group boundaries can be crossed or permeated more 
easily than others. In general, however, switching ethnicities takes time and effort and is a 
stressful experience (Berry 2003). Moreover, even when pressured by a particular ethnic 
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group, the degree to which the individual ends up being accepted by this group is uncertain. 
Still, when it comes to fitting into a particular socio-cultural environment, individuals’ best 
course of action will often be to adapt their ethnic identity.  
Given these expected costs and benefits of ethnicity change, we predict that, over 
time, a small percentage of all individuals may forgo their original ethnicity and adopt a new 
ethnic identity. Of course, the prevalence of intra-individual ethnicity change is strongly 
dependent on local circumstances, including the presence of other ethnic groups. Moreover, 
we expect that intra-individual ethnicity change is more common among individuals who 
have experienced a so-called major life event (e.g., interethnic marriage or internal migration) 
and a corresponding shock to their social environment. The underlying idea is that major life 
events are likely to prompt individuals to seek acceptance by a new social group, which is to 
say that the expected benefits of ethnicity change will be higher in case a major life event has 
occurred. An interethnic marriage, for instance, exposes the individual to a family-in-law that 
may be reluctant to accept him/her, not least because he/she is unacquainted with the family’s 
ethnic customs and traditions. Two specific expectations are that intra-individual ethnicity 
change is more likely to occur coincidental with (i) internal migration and with (ii) an 
interethnic marriage.3 
 
II.D. Two Empirical Observations on Intra-Individual Ethnicity Change 
The IFLS data enable us to make two chief empirical observations (EO1 and EO2) that fit the 
above argument about the likelihood of intra-individual ethnicity change in general and 
coincidental with major life events in particular. 
                                                 
3 Other major life events exist, including the birth of a child or the death of a spouse. 
However, we expect that, on average, intermarriage and internal migration bring about much 
larger changes in individuals’ social environment. 
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II.D.1. Intra-Individual Ethnicity Change is Common (EO1) 
The first empirical observation (EO1) is that intra-individual ethnic identity is not uncommon 
and occurs universally among different ethnic and demographic groups in Indonesia. Based 
on raw descriptive statistics for the IFLS sample, 6.92% of Indonesians have changed their 
self-reported ethnicity sometime between 2000 and 2014 (Table A4 in Appendix A). 
However, in the IFLS sample, certain (ethnic) subgroups in Indonesia are overrepresented 
and others underrepresented. Hence, we have also estimated the marginal probability of intra-
individual ethnicity change while controlling for various individual-level, ethnicity-level and 
community-level factors and year/wave fixed effects. After these corrections, the marginal 
probability of intra-individual ethnicity change is slightly lower, 6.86% (95%CI: 
6.53─7.19%). The prevalence of intra-individual ethnicity change is further lower among 
individuals with only primary education or less but higher among individuals with at least 
some tertiary education. Ethnic identity change is also less common among older people and 
more common among younger people. Figure 1 presents the marginal probability of 
undirected intra-individual ethnicity change for these various groups. Table B1 in Appendix 
B presents details on the underlying empirical results.  
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive results on the prevalence of specific dyadic ethnicity 
switches in the IFLS sample. Ethnicity change appears particularly common among the 
Melaya and the Komering. Only about 27-30% of all members of these two ethnic groups 
have kept their ethnicity during the period 2000-2014. Similarly, among Javanese that have 
changed their ethnicity, the most popular switch has been to Sundanese. Although only 3% of 
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Javanese have changed their ethnicity, 1.2% of all Javanese (or about two-fifths of all 
Javanese ethnicity switchers) have become Sundanese. Two particularly popular switches 
involve Melaya becoming Betawi (almost 39% of all Melaya) and Komering becoming 
South-Sumatrese (44% of all Komering). Even though some specific ethnic switches are 
more prevalent in the IFLS sample than others are, it nevertheless seems that ethnic identity 
switching occurs in all ethnic groups. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
II.D.2. Intra-Individual Ethnicity Change Occurs Systematically (EO2) 
The second empirical observation (EO2) is that intra-individual ethnicity change is more 
likely to occur coincidental with major life events, specifically interprovincial migration and 
interethnic marriage (also known as intermarriage or exogamy) (Figure 2). We define an 
intermarriage as a marriage where an individual’s ethnicity at time t-1 is different from the 
ethnicity of the individual’s spouse at time t. About 9.81% of the individuals in our sample 
have engaged in an interethnic marriage between 2000 and 2014. We define interprovincial 
migrants as individuals who live in one of Indonesia’s 34 provinces at time t but lived in 
another province at time t-1. Since different ethnic groups in Indonesia are geographically 
concentrated, interprovincial migration tends to be associated with becoming exposed to a 
different locally dominant ethnic group. However, to be complete, we also consider 
intraprovincial, intercommunity migrants, which we define as individuals who live in one 
community at time t but in another community in the same province at time t-1. Some 21.6% 
of the individuals in our sample have migrated either from one province to another or from 
one community to another at some point between 2000 and 2014. As expected, a 
comparatively small share of this group, though still 4.27% of the individuals in our sample, 
16 
have migrated from one Indonesian province to another in the same period. 
 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
 
In line with the literature on acculturation and major life events, results indicate that 
the marginal probability that a newlywed individual that married a spouse with a different 
ethnicity also changed his/her ethnic identity is about 27.3% (95%CI: 25.2─29.5%) or almost 
four times higher than the marginal probability of intra-individual ethnicity change for all 
Indonesians. Moreover, the marginal probability that a newlywed individual that married a 
spouse with the same ethnicity also changed his/her ethnic identity is only 3.07% (95%CI: 
2.70─3.43%) and thus significantly lower than the marginal probability of intra-individual 
ethnicity change for all Indonesians. Similarly, the marginal probability that an individual 
that has moved to another province within Indonesia also changed his/her ethnicity is 15.9% 
(95%CI: 13.7─18.0%) or more than twice as high as the marginal probability of intra-
individual ethnicity change for all Indonesians. The marginal probability that an individual 
that has moved to another community also changed his/her ethnicity is lower, about 9.50% 
(95%CI: 8.78─10.2%), but also significantly higher than the marginal probability of intra-
individual ethnicity change for all Indonesians. 
Importantly, we have estimated all the marginal probabilities presented in Figure 2 
with both ethnic group fixed effects and religious group fixed effects controlled for (see 
Table B2 in Appendix B for details). Hence, the apparent relationship between interethnic 
marriage and (interprovincial) migration on the one hand and intra-individual ethnicity 
change on the other is not driven by a specific form of ethnic churning, particularly by a 
generic tendency of all non-Javanese to become Javanese. Results are further robust to 
controlling for individual fixed effects (Table B3). In principle, it is possible that the 
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occurrence of a major life event and ethnic identity change are both affected by the same 
unobserved individual trait. Individuals who are more socially apt, for instance, are probably 
both more likely to find an other-ethnic spouse and to change their ethnicity. However, since 
controlling for individual fixed effects does not render substantially different results, it seems 
that there is a genuine coincidence between major life events and undirected intra-individual 
ethnicity change. Finally, we obtain qualitatively similar descriptive statistics and results on 
the prevalence of intra-individual ethnicity change when we measure intra-individual 
ethnicity change by considering whether individuals self-report an ethnic identity that is 
different from both the ethnicity of their father and of their mother (Table B4). 
Two extensions to these basic empirical observations are as follows. First, additional 
analyses indicate that changes in self-reported ethnic identity are associated with relevant 
behavioral adjustments (Table B5). In particular, more than 85% of the Indonesians who have 
changed their ethnicity between two waves have also learned the language of their new ethnic 
group in this period. In addition, more than 14% of ethnic identity switchers started learning 
the language of their new ethnic group in the seven years since they changed their self-
reported ethnicity. As before, these results are robust to controlling for individual fixed 
effects. However, with individual fixed effects controlled for, the probability that an 
Indonesian that has changed his/her ethnicity has also learned the language of his/her new 
ethnic group drops to about 38%. Second, we find comparable evidence on intra-individual 
identity change for other countries, specifically on intra-individual racial identity change in 
the U.S. (Appendix D) and intra-individual changes in caste identity in India (Appendix E). 
In the U.S., for instance, the marginal probability of intra-individual racial identity change for 
newlyweds that have married a spouse with a different racial identity is about 20.2% (95%CI: 
15.6─24.7%), which is much higher than the marginal probability for newlyweds that have 
married a spouse with the same racial identity (-0.19%; 95%CI: -0.59─0.21%) (see Models 
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D1-D3 in Table D1 in Appendix D). Races in the U.S., but also castes in India, are associated 
with systematic differences in social class or status. According to the empirical evidence, 
however, such a hierarchy of social identities does not prevent churning among these 
identities. We conclude that the idea of intra-individual ethnicity change is not unique to 
Indonesia and that systematic changes in individuals’ chief social identity also occur when 
group boundaries appear less permeable. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS 
III.A. Contextual Variation in Expected Costs and Benefits of Directed Ethnicity 
Change 
III.A.1. Intermarriage, Matrilocality, and Spousal Ethnic Adaptation 
The evidence that intra-individual ethnicity change coincides with major changes in 
individuals’ social environment, as proxied by interprovincial migration and marrying an 
individual from a different ethnic group, is highly supportive of the idea that ethnicity is, in 
part, an outcome of deliberate choices that individuals make. At the same time, the evidence 
underlying EO2 does not rule out that there might be some form of systematic measurement 
error that drives our results on individuals’ generic choice to change their ethnicity (cf. Alba 
et al. 2016; Davenport 2020; Kramer et al. 2016). In particular, it is possible that 
experiencing a major life event makes individuals’ ethnic identities more salient, which, in 
turn, affects their subjective feeling of belonging to particular ethnic groups or not. Hence, 
for the purpose of making definitive claims that ethnicity is, in part, a choice based on 
cost/benefit considerations, in this section we assess how external, contextual factors 
systematically affect directed ethnicity change (i.e., an individual’s choice to convert to a 
specific ethnicity or not), because they influence the individual’s expected costs and benefits 
of ethnicity change. 
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We focus this part of the analysis on individuals who have married a spouse from a 
different ethnic group and their choice whether to convert to the ethnicity of their spouse, 
what we call spousal ethnic adaptation. Interethnic marriages often involve one spouse 
forgoing his/her ethnicity and adopting the ethnicity of the other spouse, which is a form of 
directed ethnicity change. The rationale is that adopting the ethnicity of one’s spouse 
provides a chief means for getting accepted by the spouse’s circle of friends and social 
network, not least the spouse’s family. Of course, intra-individual ethnicity change following 
intermarriage means that one of the spouses retains his/her ethnicity, while the other spouse 
forgoes his/her original ethnicity in favor of the former’s ethnicity. The contextual factor that 
we consider concerns local, community-specific norms on matrilocality (i.e., married 
couples’ co-residence with the bride’s family). Variation in these deep-rooted norms, 
specifically whether a community is matrilocal or non-matrilocal, is a plausibly exogenous 
source of variation in the net benefits that individuals can expect to receive from converting 
to a specific ethnicity or retaining their original ethnicity. Specifically, matrilocal residence 
norms affect how much a man or woman can expect to benefit or lose from giving up his/her 
ethnicity or how much one’s husband or one’s wife would benefit or lose from forgoing 
his/her ethnicity and convert to one’s own ethnicity.4 
There are three main ways in which matrilocal residence norms (or local post-marital 
residence norms more generally) affect the tradeoff that otherwise identical intermarried men 
and women face between retaining their original ethnicity vs. adopting a specific alternative 
ethnic identity, i.e., the ethnicity of their spouse. First, for newly intermarried men, 
                                                 
4 The literature distinguishes two other norms on post-marital residence, patrilocality and 
neolocality (Gruijters and Ermisch 2019; Holden et al. 2003). Patrilocal norms prescribe that, 
after their marriage, couples will live at the (parents of the) grooms’ place. Neolocal norms 
prescribe that newlyweds reside separately from both the wife’s and the husband’s family. 
20 
matrilocality means co-residing with in-laws from another ethnic group. Living together with 
certain people intensifies an individual’s contact and interactions with these people. 
Moreover, spending most time with in-laws that have a different ethno-cultural tradition, 
speak a different language and/or adhere to a different religion increases the salience of the 
husband’s otherness, causing him to feel alienated and socially excluded (Tajfel and Turner 
2004). As a result, a husband is likely to want to fit in with and be accepted by his new 
family. He can do this by acculturating into his wife’s ethnic group. Second, matrilocal post-
marital residence norms increase the bargaining power of women in interethnic households 
(Bowie 2008; Fortunato 2012; Hyde 1999). Interethnic couples often emphasize one ethnic 
background within the household, not least when deciding on the ethnic tradition in which to 
raise their children. At the same time, both the wife and the husband typically have a strong 
preference for retaining their own, ancestral ethnic identity (and for socializing their children 
in the same tradition) (Berry 1997; Jia and Persson 2019). The bargaining power that 
matrilocal residence norms afford women are therefore likely to increase the probability of a 
husband conforming to his wife’s ethnic preferences and identity rather than the other way 
around. Third, for an intermarried woman who lives with her parents there is likely a great 
deal of pressure not to abandon her family’s ethnic identity. Living with her family, a newly 
intermarried woman is less willing to risk alienating herself from this family by switching to 
another ethnic group. Finally, there is an indirect effect of matrilocality on spousal ethnic 
adaptation involving the approximate co-occurrence of matrilocal residence norms and so-
called matrilineality, which refers to the cultural norm of giving women priority in succession 
whereas men may be excluded from inheriting wealth or a social position belonging to the 
family (Fortunato 2012; Gneezy et al. 2009). In many matrilocal communities there is 
therefore an added reason why a wife does not want to alienate herself from her family, 
namely the risk of losing (part of) her inheritance. In fact, even a husband may encourage his 
21 
wife not to abandon her family’s ethnicity in order to maximize the chance of their joint 
household receiving a substantial inheritance from his wife’s family. Overall, we expect that 
deep-rooted community-specific norms on matrilocal co-residence are a powerful influence 
guiding newly intermarried women’s and men’s choice between forgoing their original or 
ancestral ethnicity and adopting their spouses’ ethnicity or not. Hence, we propose the 
following set of twin hypotheses on spousal ethnic adaptation and intra-individual ethnicity 
change coincidental with marrying a spouse with a different ethnicity:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Newly intermarried men living in matrilocal communities are more 
likely to adopt their wives’ ethnicity than newly intermarried men living 
in communities with other post-marital residence norms are. 
Hypothesis 1b: Newly intermarried women living in matrilocal communities are less 
likely to adopt their husbands’ ethnicity than newly intermarried 
women living in communities with other post-marital residence norms 
are. 
 
We test these hypotheses later on in this section. First, however, we provide details on our 
measurement of spousal ethnic adaptation and community-level cultural norms on 
matrilocality. 
 
III.A.2. Measures of Spousal Ethnic Adaptation as Directed Ethnicity Change  
Focusing on newly intermarried individuals, we define spousal ethnic adaptation as the 
choice to forgo one’s original ethnicity and convert to the ethnicity of one’s spouse. The IFLS 
item on the (self-reported) ethnicity of an individual’s spouse is akin to the item asking 
individuals about their own ethnicity. The item simply asks a respondent’s spouse to indicate 
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the ethnic group to which he/she belongs, should a spouse be present (see Table A1 in 
Appendix A for details on this item). Alternatively, if the spouse is not home at the time of 
the interview, the respondent him-/herself indicates the ethnic group to which the spouse 
belongs. We combine this measure of spousal ethnicity with various measures of an 
individual’s own ethnicity (see Section II) to provide different operationalizations of spousal 
ethnic adaptation. 
First, we use the item on an individual’s own, self-reported ethnicity to construct a 
dummy variable that has value 1 if the individual’s self-reported ethnicity at time t is unequal 
to the individual’s self-reported ethnicity at time t-1 but is equal to the ethnicity of the 
individual’s spouse at time t. This variable thus has value 0 if the individual’s self-reported 
ethnicity at time t is equal to the individual’s self-reported ethnicity at time t-1 or if the 
individual’s self-reported ethnicity at time t is not equal to the ethnicity of the individual’s 
spouse at time t. In similar fashion, we consider the item asking individuals about their 
parents’ ethnicity to create a second dummy variable on spousal ethnic adaptation. This 
dummy variable has value 1 if an individual’s self-reported ethnicity at time t is unequal to 
the individual’s ancestral ethnicity at time t-1 but is equal to the ethnicity of the individual’s 
spouse at time t. This variable thus has value 0 if the individual’s self-reported ethnicity at 
time t is equal to his/her ancestral ethnicity at time t-1 or if the individual’s self-reported 
ethnicity at time t is not equal to the ethnicity of the individual’s spouse at time t. 
Spousal ethnic adaptation is quite common in our sample of individuals who have 
intermarried (N = 722). Depending on the specific measure of spousal ethnic adaptation 
considered, 42.2% (95%CI: 42.1─42.4%) of all individuals who have married a spouse with 
a different ethnicity convert to the ethnicity of their spouse, meaning that they forgo their 
original ethnicity. Table A1 in Appendix A presents details on the two measures of spousal 
ethnic adaptation that we consider as well as on the IFLS items that we use to construct these 
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measures. 
 
III.A.3. Measure of Post-Marital Residence Norms 
To measure the presence of a matrilocal post-marital residence norm in a particular 
community we draw on the “Adat” (traditional lifestyle) module included in Wave 4 of the 
IFLS, which was conducted in 2007. This module asks the mayor of a particular community 
(or a similar type of high-ranked government official) about specific cultural features of the 
local community. One of the questions concerns the residence of newlyweds: “Putting aside 
economic constraints, where does the newly married couple life after their marriage?” 
Possible answers to this item are that couples reside at the (parents of the) bride’s place, at the 
(parents of the) groom’s place or neither, which includes the norm that newlyweds reside at 
their own place. We create a dummy variable of matrilocality that has a value of 1 if the norm 
in the community is that married couples reside at the (parents of the) brides’ place and a 
value of 0 otherwise. The sample of newly intermarried men and women that we can consider 
comprises 162 different communities of which 90 are matrilocal. Moreover, 57.4% of the 
individuals in the sample of newly intermarried individuals live in a community classified as 
matrilocal. Given the geographic areas covered by the IFLS sample (e.g., Sumatera, Java), 
these numbers match the prevalence of matrilocal residence norms in Indonesia reported in 
the literature (Guilmoto 2015; Rammohan and Robertson 2012). The Adat module has only 
been included in Wave 4 of the IFLS. However, because cultural differences are highly stable 
over time (Beugelsdijk et al. 2015; Hofstede 2001), we can use the same measure of local 
marital residence norms for observations from Wave 5 of the IFLS. Table A5 in Appendix A 
presents a list of how the communities in our sample are spread across provinces. Figure A1 
illustrates the prevalence of matrilocal communities for the Indonesian provinces included in 
the analysis. 
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III.A.4. Empirical Model and Control Variables 
Following Hypotheses 1a and 1b, for the empirical analysis, we estimate differences in the 
likelihood of spousal ethnic adaptation of newly intermarried men and newly intermarried 
women living in matrilocal vs. non-matrilocal communities. Our sample comprises 
individuals nested in communities that are measured in different waves/years. Hence, we 
have cross-sections of individuals that are repeated at the community level and the basic 
empirical model that we estimate is: 
 
E୧ୡ୲ ൌ β଴ ൅ βଵF୧ ൅ βଶG୧Mୡ൅βଷZ୧ୡ୲ ൅ βସS୧୲ ൅ βହI୧୲ ൅ R୧ ൅ Dୡ ൅ δ୲ ൅ γୡ୲ ൅ u୧ୡ୲.  (1) 
 
In this model, Eict denotes spousal ethnic adaption of newly intermarried individual i living in 
community c at time t, Gi denotes gender (male or female), Mc denotes whether the 
community is matrilocal, GiMc denotes the interaction between gender and matrilocal 
residence norms in one’s community, Zict denotes possible individual-level and/or (time-
varying) community-level control variables. The specific control variables that we include are 
mostly the same control variables that we considered in Section II. Hence, we control for a 
variety of individual-level factors such as educational degree or ability to speak the official 
national language and also for interviewer-level variables that speak to possible sources of 
measurement error. In addition, we control for ethnic minority status, as there is a possibility 
that individuals use intermarriage as a means to escape their minority status and become a 
member of the ethnic majority in a particular area. Because ethnic spousal adaptation 
involves both the individual and his/her spouse as decision makers we further consider the 
education level of the spouse as a proxy for the spouse’s bargaining power (Spierings et al. 
2010). 
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As before, including ethnic group and religious group fixed effects (Ri) helps ensure 
that our results do not reflect specific patterns in intra-individual ethnicity change, for 
instance, that all non-Javanese intermarried individuals adopt the Javanese ethnicity of their 
spouse. Because community-level cultural norms do not vary over time, for most analyses we 
prefer estimating a model that includes community fixed effects (Dc), year fixed effects (t) 
and community-year interactions (ct). We include year fixed effects and/or year fixed effects 
interacted with community fixed effects to rule out that our results are driven by time-
invariant or time-varying community-level factors. A specific example is that we take into 
account any biases that might occur when the incidence of ethnic conflicts or tensions in a 
region (e.g., in North-Sumatera, Bali or Sulawesi), which likely affects the permeability of 
ethnic boundaries (Bertrand 2003), is correlated with the presence of non-matrilocal 
residence norms in the region (see Table A5 and Figure A1 in Appendix A). Of course, 
including community fixed effects means that we do not consider the direct effect of 
matrilocality (Mc) on spousal ethnic adaptation. 
As a robustness check, we extend the baseline results that we obtain from estimating 
Equation 1 by considering several additional moderating effects. First, in some Indonesian 
regions, ethnicity is not a particularly salient issue (Bazzi et al. 2019), which, in turn, may 
affect the likelihood of spousal ethnic adaptation. We explore this issue using the ability of an 
individual to speak Bahasa Indonesia, the national language. We expect that ethnicity is less 
salient among couples that use the national language in their daily lives instead the ethnic 
language of one of the spouses. Hence, as an added control we include the interaction 
between matrilocal marital residence norms in one’s community and the ability of an 
individual to speak Bahasa Indonesia. In addition, we correct for the possibility that 
matrilocality has an indirect influence on the decision to adopt the ethnicity of one’s spouse 
through individual-level factors that correlate with matrilocality. Specifically, we take into 
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account that women, on average, may be (relatively) more highly educated in matrilocal 
communities than in non-matrilocal communities (Lowes 2020), and that, therefore, they are 
less likely to adopt the ethnicity of their husbands. Because both women’s absolute level of 
education and their level of education relative to their husbands may be affected, we include 
two further interaction terms: matrilocality interacted with the educational degree of the 
individual and matrilocality interacted with a measure of the difference in education level 
between spouses.  
Finally, to overcome the heteroscedasticity issues that result from considering a 
nominal dependent variable, we estimate all models in terms of log odds (logistic models). 
Similarly, to be conservative, we correct estimated standard errors for clustering at the level 
immediately above the community level. Tables A1 and A4 in Appendix A present a brief 
description and summary statistics for the main variables in the analyses, including the three 
additional interaction terms. 
 
III.B. Results: Directed Ethnicity Change under Different Post-Marital Residence 
Norms 
III.B.1. Baseline Results 
Figure 3 presents the estimated marginal probabilities of newly intermarried men and women 
adopting the ethnicity of their spouse when living in matrilocal communities vs. when living 
non- matrilocal communities. These probabilities differ (statistically) highly significantly: 
45.1% (95%CI: 41.4─48.7%) vs. 31.4% (95%CI: 23.2─39.7%) for men and 41.2% (95%CI: 
38.3─44.2%) vs. 55.1% (95%: 46.0─64.3%) for women. Specifically, our results indicate 
that the probability of newly intermarried men adopting the ethnicity of their wives is 13.7 
percentage points (95%CI: 1.75─25.5%) higher among couples living in matrilocal 
communities compared to couples living in non-matrilocal communities, which supports 
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Hypothesis 1a. Similarly, results indicate that the probability of newly intermarried women 
adopting the ethnicity of their husbands is 13.9 percentage points (95%CI: 1.76─26.0%) 
lower among couples living in matrilocal communities compared to couples living in non-
matrilocal communities, which supports Hypothesis 1b. 
 
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 
 
Table C1 in Appendix C presents the complete results underlying the marginal 
probabilities presented in Figure 3. Moreover, to be complete, Table C2 repeats the baseline 
analyses presented in Table C1 but considers a measure of spousal ethnic adaptation based on 
the ethnicity of individuals’ parents. Results are highly similar although estimates are less 
precise, particularly for men. 
 
III.B.2. Robustness Checks with Added Moderators 
Digging deeper, Table C3 in Appendix C reports results of analyses that consider several 
additional community-level and individual-level moderators. First, our results are robust to 
controlling for individuals’ ability to speak the national language as a factor that moderates 
the influence of matrilocal post-marital residence norms on spousal ethnic adaptation (Model 
C7). Second, results are robust to controlling for the possibility that matrilocality has an 
indirect moderating effect involving a possible influence of matrilocality on individuals’ own 
level of education (Model C8) or on the difference in education levels between spouses 
(Model C9). We obtain similar results when considering all three additional moderators 
simultaneously (Model C10). Hence, we deem it unlikely that the apparent moderating effect 
of matrilocality (Figure 3, Tables C1 and C2) is spurious and does not reflect the influence of 
variation in expected costs and benefits of ethnicity change on newly intermarried men’s and 
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women’s choice to convert to the ethnicity of their spouse or not. 
We draw two conclusions. The first is that men’s and women’s likelihood of spousal 
ethnic adaptation is systematically affected by deep-rooted post-marital residence norms. The 
second conclusion, however, is more general, namely that ethnic identity and intra-individual 
ethnic identity change is a choice that is causally affected by differences in the expected costs 
and benefits of retaining one’s original ethnicity vs. adopting a specific other ethnicity. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
IV.A. Do People Choose their Ethnicities? 
Individuals’ ethnic identities have implications for many aspects of their lives, including how 
they are treated by other people, ranging from (prospective) employers to potential romantic 
partners and from banks to online buyers. At the same time, there is a growing consensus 
among social scientists that individuals’ ethnicity is malleable and not a fixed trait defined by 
their (genetic) ancestry. In line with the emerging consensus, this paper has presented 
extensive empirical evidence indicating that intra-individual changes in (self-reported) 
ethnicity are not uncommon and associated with important individual behavioral adjustments, 
particularly the learning of a new language. More importantly, further empirical results 
strongly suggest that individuals choose between specific alternative ethnicities and that this 
choice is deliberate, guided by a weighing of expected costs and benefits of either retaining 
one’s original ethnicity or forgoing this ethnicity in favor of a particular new ethnicity. These 
results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of control variables, including controlling for 
individual fixed effects. 
Moreover, focusing on intra-individual ethnicity change among newly intermarried 
men and women, we have used variation in the form of deep-rooted post-marital residence 
norms to identify how differences in expected costs and benefits causally affect individuals’ 
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decisions to convert to the ethnicity of their spouses (and of their spouses’ family). A local 
cultural norm on matrilocality—newlyweds are expected to co-reside with the wife’s 
family—bolsters plausibly exogenous variation in the costs and benefits that newly 
intermarried men and women can expect from retaining their ethnicity or adopting a new one, 
specifically wives forgoing their families’ ethnicity or husbands adopting the ethnicity of 
their wives’ family. Empirical results indicate that newly intermarried women living in 
matrilocal communities are far less likely to forgo their original or ancestral ethnicity than 
newly intermarried women living in non-matrilocal communities are. Vice versa, newly 
intermarried men living in matrilocal communities are far more likely to adopt their wives’ 
ethnicity than newly intermarried men living in non-matrilocal communities are. Hence, there 
is convincing evidence that one’s ethnic identity is, at least partly, a choice that individuals 
make after careful consideration of the costs and benefits of retaining their current ethnicity 
vs. adopting a specific alternative ethnicity. 
Our findings show the usefulness of a broadened approach to the economics of social 
identity in which individuals’ identity is endogenous and not merely a parameter in their 
utility function as in Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) seminal work. More generally, our study 
adds an important cost/benefit perspective to the vast literature on social identity formation, 
particularly the formation of ethnic and racial identities (Berry 1997; Erickson 1968; Helms 
1990; Wimmer 2013). Even when individuals’ ethnicity is strongly rooted in their (genetic) 
ancestry and family-level ethnic socialization, individuals seem both willing and able to 
change their ethnicity if they expect certain benefits from becoming a member of another 
ethnic group. 
At the same time, we should note that some of our empirical findings could be partly 
specific to the Indonesian context and its language-based ethnic boundaries. Although we 
present comparable empirical observations on intra-individual identity change in India and 
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the U.S., the permeability of ethnic group boundaries in Indonesia is probably higher than in 
a number of other countries, particularly countries in which ethnic group boundaries are 
based on less malleable, phenotypical traits. As a result, in these other countries, the ability of 
individuals to switch ethnic identities is likely lower than it is in Indonesia. Notwithstanding 
that language is the most common ethnic group boundary (Alesina et al. 2003; Easterly and 
Levine 1997), we should thus be careful not to overstate the ability to switch ethnicities in 
different ethnic contexts. In general, changing one’s ethnicity is not easy but stressful and not 
something that individuals are likely to do lackadaisically. 
 
IV.B. Implications of Ethnicity as Choice 
Implications of ethnicity or ethnic group membership as a choice are far-reaching and 
concern scholarly research and government policies and public policy making alike. Most 
fundamentally, the idea of ethnicity as choice raise questions about what we know (or what 
we think we know) about ethnic cleavages and inequalities in society as well as about ethnic 
fractionalization and the size of various ethnic groups in society. There is much work in the 
social sciences documenting a general lack of social interactions between members of 
different ethnic groups, exemplified by infrequent interethnic contact and few interethnic 
friendships as well as residential, marital and school segregation. Similarly, many studies 
have reported systematic differences in socioeconomic outcomes and status between 
members of different ethnic groups. Moreover, extant evidence on the extent of ethnic 
segregation and discrimination has motivated many governments worldwide to implement 
ethnicity-based policies, for instance, affirmative action plans or deliberate geographic 
spreading of ethnic group members. 
There is a large literature discussing and empirically investigating potential challenges 
that limit the effectiveness of using ethnicity or some other social categorization as a basis for 
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directing policy making, particularly affirmative action (Bagde et al. 2016; Fryer and Loury 
2005, 2016; Holzer and Neumark 2000, 2006). Moreover, there is some work discussing the 
usefulness and legitimacy of using ethnic or racial identity as an eligibility criterion for 
affirmative action compared to using a direct measure of eligibility based on actual 
socioeconomic disadvantage (Cancian 1998; Darity et al. 2011; Kahlenberg 1996; Malamud 
1995). However, these literatures do not yet consider how ethnicity as choice affects both the 
evidence on ethnic segregation and discrimination as well as the usefulness of ethnicity-based 
policies. Concerning the former in particular we find that directed ethnicity change 
undermines received wisdom on the degree to which ethnic groups in society are divorced or 
intermingling. Changing one’s ethnicity is a chief means for individuals to fit into a particular 
social environment. Neglecting the potential for intra-individual ethnicity change therefore 
means overlooking a significant part of real-world interactions among and inclusion of 
different ethnic groups in society. The use of longitudinal population or census data, in 
contrast, would make it possible to correct for systematic changes in individuals’ ethnicity 
and thus address this measurement problem. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
As an example, consider marital homogamy and intermarriage. Intergroup friendship, 
intergroup relationships and, particularly, intermarriage (or co-habitation) are widely taken as 
signs of decreasing social distance between groups in society and social acceptance of 
members of one group by members of another group. The cross-sectional data for Indonesia 
suggest that 14.5% (95%CI: 13.9─15.0%) of marriages in Indonesia is interethnic (Table 2, 
Row 1). Correcting for systematic intra-individual ethnicity change, in contrast, renders a 
share that is significantly larger, 19.2% (95%CI: 18.6─19.8%). Results for the U.S. and India 
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are even more pronounced (Table 2, Rows 2-4). In the U.S., the prevalence of interracial 
marriage nearly doubles, from 5.87% to 8.60%. In India, intercaste marriages used to be 
officially illegal but amount to 17.7% of all marriages when taking into account individuals’ 
tendency to change their caste identity coincidental with marrying a spouse who belongs to a 
different caste. It thus seems that taking social identities such as ethnicity as fixed indeed 
results in a sizeable overstatement of actual levels of ethnic, racial or caste-based segregation 
in society. Moreover, this sort of overstatement will bias assessments of the effectiveness of 
policies aimed at fostering desegregation and social inclusion. Policy interventions for 
decreasing ethnic segregation in schools or housing, for instance, are difficult to evaluate 
accurately when individuals deliberately change their ethnic self-perception to match the 
ethnic group that is most salient in their new school or new neighborhood. More generally, 
any analysis of ethnic or racial fractionalization in society would do well not to look at raw 
numbers on group sizes only but to take into account individuals’ crossing of ethnic and 
racial boundaries. Nation building, for instance, would not only be fostered by decreased 
ethnic fractionalization but also by increased permeability of ethnic group boundaries. In 
such a case, society can still comprise a plethora of ethnic groups but polarization would 
nevertheless be low, as continuous churning among these groups boosts social cohesion. 
Overall, a chief lesson from this paper is that properly studying and assessing social 
segregation requires detailed analysis of the degree to which boundaries between groups in 
society are permeable and enable individuals to switch their chief social identities. 
 
 
Appendix A: Description of Indonesian Data (IFLS) and Construct Validity of 
Measured Ethnic Identity 
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<Insert Tables A1, A2.1, A2.2, A2.3, A3, A4 and A5 and Figure A1 here> 
 
 
Appendix B: Regression Analyses Underlying Empirical Observations 1 and 2 (EO1 
and EO2) 
 
<Insert Tables B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5 here> 
 
 
Appendix C: Robustness Checks of Main Analyses 
 
<Insert Tables C1, C2 and C3 here> 
 
Appendix D: Intra-Individual Racial Identity Change and Racial Intermarriage in the 
U.S. 
 
<Insert Tables D1 and D2 here> 
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Figure 1. Marginal probability of intra-individual ethnicity change among different age cohorts and educational groups (EO1) 
 
Notes: Figure presents the marginal probability of undirected intra-individual ethnicity change among different groups in society. These marginal 
probabilities derive from the estimation of Model B1 in Table B1 in Appendix B and are estimated at means. 95% confidence intervals (CIs) are 
calculated with robust standard errors. 
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Figure 2. Marginal probability of intra-individual ethnicity change coincidental with different major life events (EO2)  
 
Notes: Figure presents the marginal probability of undirected intra-individual ethnicity change coincidental with different major life events, 
specifically marriage and internal migration. To estimate the marginal effects of interethnic and intra-ethnic marriage, we restrict the sample to 
married individuals. To estimate the marginal effects of interprovincial and intercommunity migration, we restrict the sample to internal 
migrants. The reported marginal probabilities derive from the estimation of the models in Table B2 of Appendix B and are estimated at means. 
95% confidence intervals (CIs) are calculated using robust standard errors. 
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Figure 3. Marginal probabilities of spousal ethnic adaptation among newly intermarried men and women in matrilocal vs. non-
matrilocal communities  
 
Panel A 
Effect of matrilocal post-marital residence norms on spousal ethnic 
adaptation by newly intermarried men 
Panel B 
Effect of matrilocal post-marital residence norms on spousal ethnic 
adaptation by newly intermarried women 
 
 
Notes: Figure presents marginal probabilities of spousal ethnic adaptation, which is a form of directed intra-individual ethnicity change. These 
marginal probabilities derive from the estimation of Models C2 (newly intermarried men) and C3 (newly intermarried women) in Table C1 of 
Appendix C. 95% confidence intervals (CIs) are calculated with cluster robust standard errors. 
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Table 1. Churning and ethnic identity switching between major ethnic groups in Indonesia (in %) 
Previous 
ethnicity→ 
 
New 
ethnicity↓ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1) Javanese 
[n=12,345] 
97 5.1 0.9 1.6 0.7 5.2 9.9 0.2 1.2 2.6 0.4 1.1 0.0 9.7 0.8 0.0 8.2 3.4 11 4.6 7.3 
(2) Sundanese 
[n=3,456] 
1.2 91 0.2 0.1 0.0 2.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 4.4 0.8 0.0 9.5 8.4 0.0 0.8 2.4 
(3) Balinese 
[n=1,389] 
0.1 0.1 96 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(4) Batak 
[n=925] 
0.1 0.1 0.3 95 0.1 1 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.9 0.0 0.8 0.2 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(5) Buginese 
[n=1,036] 
0.1 0.0 1.3 0.1 96 3.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.7 0.2 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(6) Tionghao 
[n=115] 
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 72 0.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 
(7) Madurese 
[n=860] 
0.7 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 88 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 
(8)Sasak 
[n=1,215] 
0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.0 95 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(9) Minang 
[n=1,416] 
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 94 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 12 1.8 1.0 2.4 
(10) Banjarese 
[n=990] 
0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 95 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(11) Bina-
Dompu 
[n=532] 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 98 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(12) 
Makassarese 
[n=372] 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.2 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 90 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
47 
Table 1, ctd. 
Previous 
ethnicity→ 
 
New 
ethnicity↓ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(13) Nias 
[n=41] 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 90 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(14)Palem- 
bangnese 
[n=118] 
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 49 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 5.5 6.4 0.0 
(15) 
Sumbawanese 
[n=174] 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 91 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.2 0.0 
(16)Toraja 
[n=132] 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 98 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(17) Betawi 
[n=973] 
0.4 2.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 3.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 74 39 9.1 0.2 2.4 
(18) Melaya 
[n=214] 
0.3 0.7 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 1.6 0.0 4.8 30 0.0 1.8 4.9 
(19) Komering 
[n=43] 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 27 3.3 0.0 
(20) South-
Sumatran 
[n=616] 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.6 44 81 4.9 
(21) other 
[n=46) 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.2 76 
Total (sum of 
Rows 1 to 21) 
100% 
Notes: Table presents the raw percentages of all individuals in the sample switching to / retaining a specific ethnicity, say, Javanese. To improve 
readability, we have collapsed all ethnicities with fewer than 20 individual observations in a single group called “other.” This group includes 
“Ambonese,” “Ache,” “Manado” and “Dyak.” 
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Table 2. Understatement of intermarriage in Indonesia, the United States and India 
 Percentage of marriages that is an intermarriage Percentage 
difference 
corrected vs. 
uncorrected 
Percentage point 
difference corrected vs. 
uncorrected 
 Raw, not corrected for 
spousal social identity 
adaptation 
Corrected 
 
Indonesia (interethnic marriage) 
 
14.5% 
[95%CI: 13.9─15.0%] 
19.2% 
[95%CI: 18.6─19.8%] +32.4% 
4.72 (0.002) 
[p=0.000] 
 
United States (interracial marriage) 
 
5.87% 
[95%CI: 5.56─6.18%] 
8.60% 
[95% CI: 8.24─8.97%] +46.5% 
2.73 (0.001) 
[p=0.000] 
India, indirect measure based on self-
reported caste at time t-1 and time t 
(intercaste marriage) 
0§ 
17.7% 
[95%CI: 17.4─17.9%] x 
17.7 (0.001) 
[p=0.000] 
India, direct measure based on item on 
spouse’s caste (intercaste marriage) 
4.92% 
[95%CI: 4.65─5.18%] 
17.7% 
[95%CI: 17.4─17.9%] 
 
+259% 
 
12.8 (0.003) 
[p=0.000] 
Notes: Results concern only newly married individuals, meaning individuals who have married or re-married between one wave/year and the 
next. The difference between the raw and corrected measures for interethnic/interracial/intercaste marriage is that the former uses the post-
marriage ethnic self-identification of newly married individuals to calculate the prevalence of intermarriages whereas the latter uses these 
individuals’ ethnic self-identification before their marriage. We consider a marriage to be an intra-ethnic/intraracial/intra-caste marriage if the 
self-reported identity of a newly married individual is the same as the self-reported identity of his/her spouse. We consider a marriage to be an 
interethnic/interracial/intercaste marriage if the self-reported identity of a newly married individual is not the same as the self-reported racial 
identity of his/her spouse. Data for Indonesia are from the IFLS, Waves 3-5 (2000, 2007 & 2014). The prevalence of interethnic marriages in 
Indonesia is based on comparing the self-reported ethnicity of an individual with the self-reported ethnicity of the individual’s spouse (see Table 
A1 and the main text). Data for the U.S. are from the 2005-2012 Current Population Survey (Ruggles et al. 2019). The unadjusted measure of the 
prevalence of interracial marriage is based on individuals’ (and spouses’) self-reported racial identity, which is measured with the questionnaire 
item asking “What is your Race?” (see Appendix D for details). Data for India are from the India Human Development Survey or IHDS (Deai et 
al. 2005, 2012). We use two measure to estimate the prevalence of intercaste marriage in India. The first measure is based on individuals’ self-
reported caste identity. This measure of caste identity derives from the questionnaire item asking “Which caste do you belong to?” (see Appendix 
E for details). The second measure is based on the item asking “Is your husband’s family the same caste as your natal family?” If this question is 
answered positively, we consider the marriage to be an intra-caste marriage (=0). If this question is answered negatively, we consider the 
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marriage to be an intercaste marriage (=1). 
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Table A1. Overview and description of key variables  
Variable Figure Table Definition/description 
Level of 
measurement 
Intra-individual 
ethnicity change 
(based on 
individual’s 
self-reported 
ethnicity) 
1,2 
B1, B2, 
B3 
Dummy variable that indicates whether an individual changes (=1) or retains (=0) 
his/her current self-reported ethnicity in comparison to the individual’s self-reported 
ethnicity in the previous wave. The underlying measure of ethnic group membership is 
based on the item asking respondents “What is your Ethnicity?” Respondents can select 
(at least) one of the following ethnicities: “Jawa,” “Sunda,” “Bali,”, “Batak,” “Bugis,” 
“Tionghoa,” “Madura,” “Sasak,” “Minang,” “Banjar,” “Bima-Dompu,” “Makassar,” 
“Nias,” “Palembang,” “Sumbawa,” “Toraja,” “Betawi,” “Dayak,” “Melayu,” 
“Komering,” “Ambon,” “Manado,” “Aceh,” “Other South Sumatera,” “Banten,” 
“Cirebon,” “Gorontalo,” “Kutai” and “Other.” This dummy variable captures generic, 
undirected intra-individual ethnicity change. 
Individual 
Intra-individual 
ethnicity change 
(based on 
parental / 
ancestral 
ethnicity) 
- B4 
Dummy variable that indicates whether an individual changes (=1) or retains (=0) 
his/her current self-reported ethnicity in comparison to the individual’s self-reported 
ethnicity of his/her parents. The underlying measure of ethnic group membership is 
based on the items asking respondents “What is your ethnicity”, “What is your father’s 
ethnicity?” and “What is your mother’s ethnicity?” For each question the respondent can 
select (at least) one of the following ethnicities: “Jawa,” “Sunda,” “Bali,”, “Batak,” 
‘Bugis,” “Tionghoa,” “Madura,” “Sasak,” “Minang,” “Banjar,” “Bima-Dompu,” 
“Makassar,” “Nias,” “Palembang,” “Sumbawa,” “Toraja,” “Betawi,” “Dayak,” 
“Melayu,” “Komering,” “Ambon,” “Manado,” “Aceh,” “Other South Sumatera,” 
“Banten,” “Cirebon,” “Gorontalo,” “Kutai” and “Other.” As above, this dummy variable 
captures generic, undirected intra-individual ethnicity change. 
Individual  
Intra-individual 
ethnicity change 
(based on ethnic 
language 
spoken) 
- B5 
Dummy variable that indicates whether individual reports speaking the ethnic language 
of his/her ethnic group after a change in one’s self-reported ethnic identity (=1) or 
whether the individual reports not currently speaking the ethnic language of his/her new 
ethnic group after a change in self-reported ethnic identity (=0). The underlying measure 
of ethnic language speaking is based on the item “What languages do you speak in your 
daily life at home?” on which respondents can answer by selecting (at least) one of the 
following ethnic languages: “Indonesian,” “Javanese,” “Sundanese,” “Maduranese,” 
“Balinese,” “Sasak,”, “Minang,” “Batak,” “Bugis,” “Chinese,” “Banjar,” “Bima,” 
Individual 
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Variable Figure Table Definition/description 
Level of 
measurement 
“Makassar,” “Nias,” “Palembang,” “Sumbawa,” “Toraja,” “Lahat,” “Other South 
Sumatra,” “Betawi,” “Lampung,” or “Other.” As above, this dummy variable captures 
generic, undirected intra-individual ethnicity change. 
Spousal ethnic 
adaptation 
(based on 
individual’s 
self-reported 
ethnicity) 
3 C1, C3 
Dummy variable that indicates whether a newly intermarried individual changes his/her 
self-reported ethnic identity and adopts the self-reported ethnicity of his/her spouse (=1) 
or retains the same ethnicity as reported in the previous wave (=0). The underlying 
measure of ethnic group membership is based on the item asking respondents “What is 
your ethnicity?” for both the individual and his/her spouse. This dummy variable 
captures directed intra-individual ethnicity change. 
Individual 
Spousal ethnic 
adaptation 
(based on 
parental / 
ancestral 
ethnicity) 
- C2 
Dummy variable that indicates whether a newly intermarried individual changes his/her 
self-reported ethnic identity and adopts the self-reported ethnicity of his/her spouse (=1) 
or retains the same ethnicity as reported in the previous wave (=0). The underlying 
measure of ethnic group membership is based on the items asking respondents “What is 
your ethnicity”, ““What is your father’s ethnicity?” and “What is your mother’s 
ethnicity?” For each question the respondent can select one of the following categories: 
“Jawa,” “Sunda,” “Bali,”, “Batak,” ‘Bugis,” “Tionghoa,” “Madura,” “Sasak,” 
“Minang,” “Banjar,” “Bima-Dompu,” “Makassar,” “Nias,” “Palembang,” “Sumbawa,” 
“Toraja,” “Betawi,” “Dayak,” “Melayu,” “Komering,” “Ambon,” “Manado,” “Aceh,” 
“Other South Sumatera,” “Banten,” “Cirebon,” “Gorontalo,” “Kutai,” and “Other.” As 
above, this dummy variable captures directed intra-individual ethnicity change. 
Individual 
Interethnic 
marriage  
2 
B2, B3 
B4 
Dummy variable that indicates whether an individual’s self-reported ethnicity before 
his/her marriage is different from the current self-reported ethnicity of his/her spouse 
(=1) or not (=0). The ethnic categories to determine the match between the ethnicity of 
the individual and his/her spouse are the same as the categories mentioned in the 
description of the measure of intra-individual ethnicity change. 
Individual 
Intra-ethnic 
marriage  
2 
B2, B3 
B4 
Dummy variable that indicates whether an individual’s self-reported ethnicity before 
his/her marriage is the same as the current self-reported ethnicity of his/her spouse (=1) 
or not (=0). The ethnic categories to determine the match between the ethnicity of the 
individual and his/her spouse are the same as the categories mentioned in the description 
of the measure of intra-individual ethnicity change. 
Individual 
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Variable Figure Table Definition/description 
Level of 
measurement 
Marriage 2 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4 
Dummy variable that indicates whether an individual has gotten married (=1) or not (=0) 
between waves. This measure is constructed based on the availability of a unique 
personal identifier for a spouse. In the case the spouse is identified in the current wave 
but not in the previous, we consider the individual to have gotten married.  
Individual 
Migration 2 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4 
Dummy variable that indicates whether an individual has migrated to a different 
community between waves (=1) or otherwise (=0). The variable is based on the 
interviewer’s recording of the community in which the interviewed household lives.  
Individual 
Interprovincial 
migration  
2 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4 
Dummy variable that indicates whether an individual has migrated to a different 
province between waves (=1) or otherwise (=0). The variable is based on the 
interviewer’s recording of the community in which the interviewed household lives.  
Individual 
Intercommunity 
migration  
2 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4 
Dummy variable that indicates whether an individual has migrated to a different 
community within the same province between waves (=1) or otherwise (=0). The 
variable is based on the interviewer’s recording of the community in which the 
interviewed household lives.  
Individual 
Age 2, 3 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4, 
B5, C1, 
C2, C3 
Interval variable running from 18-104. Individual 
Employment 
status 
1,2, 3 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4, 
B5, C1, 
C2, C3 
Set of dummies indicating the employment status of the individual. The dummies derive 
from the item asking “Which category best describes the work that you do” with the 
following possible answers: 0 = No work, 1 = Self-employed (reference), 2 = Waged 
Work, 3= Unpaid Family Work, 4 = Flexible agricultural work. 
Individual 
Education 2, 3 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4, 
B5, C1, 
C2, C3 
Set of dummies indicating the highest level of education attained by the individual. The 
dummies derive from the item asking “What is the highest education level attended” 
with the following possible answers: 1 = None or Primary (reference), 2= Lower-
Secondary, 3= Higher-Secondary, 4= Tertiary, 5 = Adult Education. 
Individual 
Religious 
denomination 
1,2, 3 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4, 
B5, C1, 
Set of dummies to indicate the religious denomination of individuals. The dummies 
derive from the item asking “What is your religion?” with the following possible 
answers: 1 = Islam, 2 = Catholic, 3 = Protestant, 4 = Hindu, 5 = Buddha, 6 = Konghucu, 
Individual 
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Variable Figure Table Definition/description 
Level of 
measurement 
C2, C3 7 = Not applicable. 
Member of 
local ethnic 
minority 
3 
C1, C2, 
C3 
Dummy variable that indicates whether the individual belongs to the largest ethnic 
group in one’s community (=0) or not (=1). The underlying measure for the individual’s 
ethnicity is based on the question: “What is your ethnicity” and for the dominant 
community ethnicity we use the question: “How is the ethnic composition in this 
village/township [with regard to the largest ethnic group]?” that is asked to one of the 
local community leaders.  
Individual 
Double 
ethnicity 
1,2 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4, 
B5 
Dummy variable that indicates whether the individual self-identifies with multiple 
ethnic backgrounds (=1) or one ethnicity (=0). The variable is based on the item asking 
“What is your Ethnicity?,” which allows individuals to indicate more than one ethnicity 
(see above).  
Individual 
Educational 
difference 
spouse 
3 
C1, C2, 
C3 
Set of dummies that indicates whether the individual has the same, more, or less 
education than his/her spouse does. The underlying measure for the variable is based on 
the question asked to the individual and one’s spouse: “What is the highest education 
level attended” with the following possible items for the individual and one’s spouse 0 = 
None, 1= Primary (reference), 2= Lower-Secondary, 3= Higher-Secondary, 4= Tertiary.  
Individual 
Perceived 
economic well-
being  
1,2, 3 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4, 
B5, C1, 
C2, C3 
Ordinal variable that indicates the subjective economic well-being from 0 (=poorest) 
until 6 (richest). The underlying measure for the variable is based on the question: 
“Please imagine a six-step ladder where on the bottom (the first step), stand the poorest 
people, and on the highest step (the sixth step), stand the richest people. On which step 
are you today?” 
Individual 
Speaks Bahasa 
national 
language 
1,2, 3 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4, 
B5, C1, 
C2, C3 
Dummy variable that indicates whether the individual is able to speak the national 
language Bahasa Indonesia (=1) or not (=0). The underlying measure for the variable is 
based on the question: “What languages do you speak in your daily life at home?”. If the 
individual answers “Bahasa Indonesia”, we consider her able to speak this language. 
Individual 
Perceived 
accuracy of 
respondent’s 
interview 
answers 
1,2, 3 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4, 
B5, C1, 
C2, C3 
Ordinal variable that indicates the interviewer’s perception on the accuracy of the 
interviewee’s answers from 1 (=not so good) until 4 (Excellent). The underlying 
measure for the variable is based on the question: “What is your evaluation of the 
accuracy of the respondent’s answers?” 
Individual 
54 
Variable Figure Table Definition/description 
Level of 
measurement 
Interviewer has 
conducted IFLS 
surveys before  
1,2, 3 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4, 
B5, C1, 
C2, C3 
Dummy variable that indicates whether the interviewer has conducted surveys before or 
whether it is the time that the interviewer participates in a large-scale survey(=0). The 
underlying measure for the variable is based on the question: “Before IFLS (4 or 5) have 
you ever been involved in any other survey?” 
Interviewer 
Ethnicity of 
interviewer  
1,2, 3 
B1, B2, 
B3, B4, 
B5, C1, 
C2, C3 
Set of dummies to indicate the self-reported ethnicity of the interviewer. The underlying 
measure for the variable is based on the question: ”What is your ethnicity” 
Interviewer 
Matrilocality / 
matrilocal 
community 
3 
C1, C2, 
C3 
Dummy variable that indicates whether a community has matrilocal residence norms 
(=1) or not (i.e., non-matrilocal residence norms) (=0). The variable is based on the 
questionnaire item asking a community’s mayor, where newly married couples I the 
community live after their wedding? If the mayor answered “The bride’s own place” or 
“The bride’s parents place,” we consider the community matrilocal (=1). Other possible 
answers, for instance, “Wherever they want”, “The groom’s own place” or “Groom’s 
parent’s house” are coded as non-matrilocal residence norms. 
Community 
Notes: Details on the wording of the various questionnaire times used can be found in the questionnaire books of the Indonesia Family Life 
Survey (Strauss et al. 2004, 2009, 2016). 
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Table A2.1. Self-reported ethnic identity and ethnic behavior (in %) 
Self-reported 
ethnicity 
Ethnic 
langua-
ge 
spoken 
Parental / 
ancestral 
ethnicity 
Religious denomination Customs 
Islam 
Catholic 
Protes
-tant 
Hindu 
Other religious 
denomination 
Own 
dog 
Own 
pig 
Eat 
beef Overall Traditional Modern 
Javanese 
[N=12,310] 
89.4 99.6 96.0 83.6 16.4 2.0 1.7 0.2 0.1 0.39 0 13.2 
Sundanese 
[N=3,373] 
83.8 99.0 99.7 94.1 5.85 0.12 0.09 0.06 0 0.30 0 14.1 
Balinese 
[N=1,403] 
96.0 99.6 1.93 100 0 0.80 0.20 97.0 0.1 5.41 6.12 5.0 
Batak 
[N=872] 
71.4 99.8 34.9 86.9 13.1 5.05 59.8 0.34 0 5.71 0.91 14.2 
Buginese 
[N=993] 
81.0 98.7 85.2 88.1 11.9 0.10 0.10 14.5 0.10 2.79 0 4.44 
Tionghao 
[N=102] 
10.8 99.0 25.5 73.3 26.7 19.6 29.4 1.0 24.5 1.85 0 35.3 
Madurese 
[N=837] 
93.0 98.9 99.4 96.8 3.29 0 0.48 0 0.12 0 0 26.2 
Sasak 
[N=630] 
96.8 100 100 92.3 7.67 0 0 0 0 0.48 0 35.2 
Minang 
[N=1,360] 
90.8 99.7 99.9 54.4 45.6 0.07 0 0 0 1.32 0 29.3 
Banjarese 
[N=940] 
98.2 99.2 100 94.7 5.3 0. 0. 0 0 0 0 9.90 
Bina-Dompu 
[N=530] 
98.2 99.6 100 75.2 24.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 18.3 
Makassarese 
[N=345] 
90.4 99.7 100 73.2 26.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.03 
Nias 
[N=37] 
81.1 100 8.10 50.0 50.0 24.3 67.6 0 0 0 0 27.0 
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Table A2.1, ctd. 
Self-reported 
ethnicity 
Ethnic 
langua-
ge 
spoken 
Parental / 
ancestral 
ethnicity 
Religious denomination Customs 
Islam 
Catholic 
Protes
-tant 
Hindu 
Other religious 
denomination 
Own 
dog 
Own 
pig 
Eat 
beef Overall Traditional Modern 
Palembang- 
nese [N=90] 
64.4 98.9 95.9 78.6 21.4 0 0 0 1.11 0 0 17.8 
Sumbawa- 
nese [N=166] 
92.8 100 100 84.9 15.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 20.5 
Toraja 
[N=128] 
90.6 100 15.8 47.1 52.9 15.0 69.3 0 0 4.76 7.94 5.47 
Betawi 
[N=795] 
- 94.0 99.4 95.8 0 0.50 0 0 0.13 0 0 14.8 
Dayak 
[N=13] 
- 84.6 53.9 66.7 33.3 15.4 30.8 0 0 0 0 15.4 
Melaya 
[N=186] 
- 98.4 100 94.6 5.4 0 0 0 0 0.78 0 8.1 
Komering 
[N=37] 
- 97.3 100 80.0 20.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.2 
Ambonese 
[N =5] 
- 60 40 0 100 0 40 20 0 0 0 0 
Acheh 
[N=10] 
- 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.0 
South-
Sumatran 
[N=581] 
89.0 98.5 99.1 87.3 22.7 0.5 0.2 0 0.2 0 0 11.5 
Notes: Source is data from the IFLS, Wave 4 (2007) and Wave 5 (2014), and own calculations. The number of individuals who self-report 
belonging to the ethnic group is in square brackets.  
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Table A2.2. Ethnic language spoken and ethnic behavior (in %) 
Ethnic 
language 
spoken 
Self-
reported 
ethnicity 
Parental / 
ancestral 
ethnicity 
Religious denomination Customs 
Islam 
Catholic 
Protes
-tant 
Hindu 
Other 
religious 
denomination 
Own 
dog 
Own 
pig 
Eat 
beef Overall Traditional Modern 
Javanese 
[n=11,261] 
97.7 98.4 95.7 83.3 16.7 2.21 1.94 0.11 0.08 0.34 0.02 12.8 
Sundanese 
[n=3,011] 
93.9 99.8 99.6 94.3 5.7 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.0 0.33 0 13.0 
Balinese 
[n=1,401] 
96.2 96.9 3.36 90.5 4.5 0.50 0.21 95.9 0.07 5.50 5.92 4.72 
Batak 
[n=644] 
96.7 97.4 23.6 89.2 10.8 5.43 70.7 0 0.31 7.12 1.24 13.3 
Buginese 
[n=834] 
96.4 97.7 82.9 86.2 13.8 0 0.12 17.0 0 3.23 0 3.60 
Tionghao 
[n=16] 
68.8 81.3 18.8 66.7 33.3 0 56.3 0 25.0 0 0 31.3 
Madurese 
[n=875] 
88.9 93.8 99.8 96.8 3.2 0 0 0.11 0.11 0.23 0 25.3 
Sasak 
[n=635] 
96.1 97.3 99.7 91.8 8.2 0 0.16 0.16 0 0.49 0 35.3 
Minang 
[n=1,306] 
94.6 95.3 99.2 53.5 46.5 0.54 0.15 0 0.08 1.36 0 30.1 
Banjarese 
[n=1,032] 
89.4 92.3 99.1 94.8 5.3 0.29 0.58 0 0 0. 0 10.4 
Bina-Dompu 
[n=526] 
98.9 98.9 100 74.7 25.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 18.3 
Makassarese 
[n=348] 
89.7 92.2 98.6 74.3 25.7 0 1.44 0 0 0 0 1.44 
Nias 
[n=32] 
93.8 93.8 3.13 - - 31.3 65.6 0 0 0 0 18.8 
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Table A2.2, ctd. 
Ethnic 
language 
spoken 
Self-
reported 
ethnicity 
Parental / 
ancestral 
ethnicity 
Religious denomination Customs 
Islam 
Catholic 
Protes
-tant 
Hindu 
Other 
religious 
denomination 
Own 
dog 
Own 
pig 
Eat 
beef Overall Traditional Modern 
Palembang- 
nese [n=209] 
27.8 45.0 98.7 80.0 20.0 0 0 0.66 0.66 0 0 23.0 
Sumbawa- 
nese [n=159] 
96.9 97.5 99.4 85.6 14.4 0 0.63 0 0 0 1.59 20.8 
Toraja 
[n=121] 
95.9 97.5 16.7 53.3 46.7 16.7 66.7 0 0 4.92 6.56 4.96 
South-
Sumatran 
[n=682] 
75.8 81.1 98.5 86.7 13.3 0.50 0.99 0 0.25 0.84 0 11.0 
Notes: Source is data from the IFLS, Wave 4 (2007) and Wave 5 (2014), and own calculations. The number of individuals who self-report 
speaking the ethnic language is in square brackets.  
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Table A2.3. Ethnic ancestry and ethnic behaviors (in %) 
Parental / 
ancestral 
ethnicity 
Self-
reported 
ethnicity 
Ethnic 
language 
spoken 
Religious denomination Customs 
Islam 
Catholic 
Protes- 
tant 
Hindu 
Other religious 
denomination 
Own 
dog 
Own 
pig 
Eat 
beef Overall Traditional Modern 
Javanese 
[n=12,331] 
99.5 89.2 95.7 83.6 16.4 2.2 1.86 0.16 0.08 0.39 0 13.2 
Sundanese 
[n=3,380] 
98.7 83.3 99.8 94.1 5.88 0.09 0.09 0.06 0 0.29 0 13.9 
Balinese 
[n=1,402] 
99.7 95.9 1.93 100 0 0.79 0.21 97.0 0.07 5.41 6.13 4.93 
Batak 
[n=871] 
99.9 71.5 34.9 86.9 13.1 5.05 59.8 0.23 0 5.72 0.92 14.2 
Buginese 
[n=982] 
99.8 81.6 85.1 88.2 11.9 0.10 0.10 14.6 0.10 2.82 0 4.50 
Tionghao 
[n=103] 
98.1 12.6 25.2 75.0 25.0 19.4 29.1 1.94 24.2 3.70 0 35.0 
Sasak 
[n=631] 
99.8 96.7 100 92.4 7.65 0 0 0 0 0.48 0 35.2 
Minang 
[n=1,363] 
99.6 90.6 100 53.9 46.1 0 0 0 0 1.17 0 23.4 
Banjarese 
[n=940] 
99.2 97.9 100 94.8 5.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.1 
Bina-
Dompu 
[n=530] 
99.8 97.9 100 74.9 25.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 18.5 
Makassarese 
[n=351] 
98.0 90.0 100 73.7 26.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.71 
Nias 
[n=37] 
100 81.1 8.11 50.0 50.0 34.3 67.6 0 0.1 0 0 27.0 
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Table A2.3, ctd. 
Notes: Source is data from the IFLS, Wave 4 (2007) and Wave 5 (2014), and own calculations. The number of individuals who self-report having 
parents belonging to the ethnic group is in square brackets. 
 
 
Parental / 
ancestral 
ethnicity 
Self-
reported 
ethnicity 
Ethnic 
language 
spoken 
Religious denomination Customs 
Islam 
Catholic 
Protes- 
tant 
Hindu 
Other religious 
denomination 
Own 
dog 
Own 
pig 
Eat 
beef Overall Traditional Modern 
Palembang- 
nese 
[n=85] 
98.8 65.5 98.8 79.3 20.8 0 0.0 0 1.18 0 0 18.8 
Sumbawa- 
nese 
[n=167] 
99.4 92.2 100 84.9 15.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 20.4 
Toraja 
[n=130] 
98.5 90.0 17.1 47.1 52.9 14.7 68.2 0 0 4.69 7.81 5.38 
Betawi 
[n=755] 
98.9 - 99.3 96.1 3.91 0 0.53 0 0.13 0 0 14.9 
Dyak 
[n =12] 
91.7 - 50 50 50 16.7 33.3 0 0 0 0 8.33 
Melaya 
[n=186] 
99.4 - 100 94.6 5.41 0 0 0 0 0.77 0 8.06 
Komering 
[n=37] 
97.3 - 100 80 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.2 
Ambonese 
[n=3] 
100 - 33.3 0 100 0 66.7 0 0 0 0 0 
Aceh 
[n=10] 
100 - 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.0 
South-
Sumatran 
[n=580] 
98.6 88.8 99.1 87.1 15.4 0.52 0.17 0 0.17 0 0 11.6 
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Table A3. Cramer’s V for measures of ethnic identity 
 Self-reported ethnicity Parental ethnicity 
Parental ethnicity 
0.975 
[p=0.000] 
- 
 
Ethnic language 
0.908 
[p=0.000] 
0.905 
[p=0.000] 
Notes: Cramer’s V indicates to what degree categorical variables coincide in meaning, for 
instance, that 97.5% of the Indonesians who self-identify as member of a specific ethnic 
group have parents that are members of the same ethnic group. Table A1 presents details on 
the different measures of ethnic identity considered. 
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Table A4. Descriptive statistics for key variables 
Variables 
Generic, undirected 
intra-individual 
ethnicity change 
[n=27,536] 
Spousal ethnic 
adaptation (directed 
intra-individual 
ethnicity change) 
[n=705] 
Main dependent variables    
Change self-reported ethnicity 6.86% (25.3%) - 
Spousal ethnic adaptation - 43.0% (49.5%) 
Major life events   
Marriage 51.8% (50.0%) - 
Interethnic marriage 7.89% (27.0%) - 
Intra-ethnic marriage 43.9% (49.6%) - 
Migration 21.6 (41.2%) - 
Interprovincial migration 4.27% (20.2%) - 
Intercommunity migration 18.2% (38.5%) - 
Individual characteristics   
Age (in years) 44.0 (13.0) 38.5 (11.1) 
Education   
Primary education or less 49.5% (50.0%) 40.2% (49.1%) 
Secondary education 40.2% (49.0%) 49.5% (50.0%) 
Tertiary education 10.3% (30.4%) 10.3% (30.4%) 
Employment status   
Unemployed 21.8% (41.3%) 23.7% (42.5%) 
Self-employed 34.9% (47.6%) 28.9% (45.4%) 
Waged work 25.3% (43.5%) 31.3% (46.4%) 
Unpaid family work 9.90% (29.9%) 7.66% (26.6%) 
Agricultural flex work 8.10% (27.3%) 8.37% (27.7%) 
Perceived economic well-being (1 
poorest - 6 richest) 
2.95 (0.957) - 
Ability to speak Bahasa national 
language (1=yes) 
26.4% (44.1%) 61.3% (48.7%) 
Education difference between 
individual and spouse 
  
Same education - 51.8% (50.0%) 
Spouse > individual - 23.7% (42.5%) 
Individual > spouse - 24.5% (43.1%) 
Perceived accuracy of 
respondent’s interview answers (1 
lowest - 5 highest) 
4.10 (0.532) 4.13 (0.536) 
Member ethnic minority (1=yes) - 36.3% (48.1%) 
Individual has double ethnicity 
(1=yes) 
0.03% (5.55%) - 
Interviewer characteristics   
Interviewer has conducted IFLS 
interviews before (1=yes) 
71.6% (45.1%) 70.2% (45.8%) 
Community characteristics   
Matrilocal (1=yes) - 61.7% (48.6%) 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for key variables in the analysis of undirected 
intra-individual ethnicity change (Column 1) and of spousal ethnic adaptation (Column 2). 
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Standard deviations are in parentheses and the number of observations in square brackets. 
Source of the data is the IFLS, Waves 3-5 (Strauss et al., 2004, 2009, 2016). See the main text 
and Table A1 for details on these variables. 
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Table A5. Matrilocal and non-matrilocal communities 
Island Province 
Number of 
communities 
Percentage of communities in 
province that is matrilocal 
Sumatera 
North-Sumatera 15 20% 
West-Sumatera 5 100% 
South-Sumatera 2 50% 
Lampung 11 27.3% 
Java 
DKI Jakarta 28 46.4% 
West-Java 36 86.1% 
Central-Java 5 80% 
East-Java 18 50% 
Banten 4 75% 
Bali Bali 6 0% 
Nusa Tenggara West-Nusa Tenggara  10 20% 
Kalimantan South-Kalimantan 12 75% 
Sulawesi 
South-Sulawesi 9 66.7% 
West-Sulawesi 1 100% 
Notes: Matrilocal vs. non-matrilocal post-marital residence norms are measured using the 
“Adat” (traditional lifestyle) module included in Wave 4 of the IFLS (see the main text and 
Table A1 for details). 
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Figure A1. The prevalence of matrilocal communities per province 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The colors indicate the percentage of communities that have matrilocal (1; dark grey) 
vs. non-matrilocal (0; light grey / white) co residence norms for the Indonesian provinces in in 
the sample, Matrilocal vs. non-matrilocal post-marital residence norms are measured using 
the “Adat” (traditional lifestyle) module included in Wave 4 of the IFLS (see the main text 
and Table A1 for details). 
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Table B1. Individual random effects estimation of education and age as factors 
predicting the likelihood of intra-individual ethnicity change 
Dependent = Intra-individual ethnicity change (1=yes) Model B1 
Educational groups  
Primary education or less (reference) 0 
Secondary education 
0.008 (0.004) 
[p=0.024] 
Tertiary education 
0.019 (0.007) 
[p=0.006] 
Age cohorts  
18-30 (reference) 0 
31-50 
-0.009 (0.004) 
[p=0.055] 
50+ 
-0.0123 (0.005) 
[p=0.019] 
Individual-level control variables   
Gender (1=female) 
0.001 (0.004) 
[p=0.753] 
Double ethnicity (1=yes) 
0.355 (0.058) 
[p=0.000] 
Ability to speak Bahasa national language (1=yes) 
0.032 (0.004) 
[p=0.000] 
Dummies for perceived accuracy of respondent’s 
interview answers 
Yes 
Dummies for subjective economic well-being Yes 
Dummies for employment status Yes 
Interviewer-level control variables  
Interviewer has conducted IFLS surveys before 
(1=yes) 
-0.007 (0.003) 
[p=0.027] 
Dummies for ethnicity of interviewer  Yes 
Ethnic group fixed effects  Yes 
Religious group fixed effects Yes 
Year/wave fixed effects Yes 
Community fixed effects Yes 
No. of observations 27,254 
No. of individuals 13,734 
Within R2 0.051 
Between R2 0.212 
Overall R2 0.170 
Notes: Table reports estimated linear probabilities. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust 
standard errors and clustered at the individual level. Robust p-values are in square brackets. 
The estimated model includes baseline fixed effects to control for time-invariant ethnic group, 
religious group, community and year-wave factors. To make the estimates of our coefficients 
more interpretable, we report the outcomes of the linear probability models only. However, 
logistic models render similar results (available on request). 
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Table B2. Individual random effects estimation of factors predicting the likelihood of intra-individual ethnicity change considering the 
role of major-life events 
Dependent = Intra-individual 
ethnicity change (1=yes) 
Model B2 
Newly married individuals only 
Model B5 
Migrants only 
Model B3 Model B4 Model B6 Model B7 
Marriage (1=yes) 
-0.002 (0.003) 
[p=0.401] 
- -  - - 
Interethnic marriage (1=yes) - 
0.243 (0.012) 
[p=0.000] 
 -  - 
Intra-ethnic marriage (1=yes) - - 
-0.243 (0.012) 
[p=0.000] 
- - - 
Migration (1=yes) - - 
 0.011 (0.004) 
[p=0.006] 
- - 
Interprovincial migration (1=yes) - - 
 
- 
0.070 (0.012) 
[p=0.000] 
- 
Intercommunity migration (1=yes) - - 
 
- - 
-0.070 (0.012) 
[p=0.000] 
Individual-level control variables        
Gender (1=female) 
0.002 (0.004) 
[p=0.681] 
0.001 (0.005) 
[p=0.823] 
0.001 (0.005) 
[p=0.823] 
0.001 (0.004) 
[p=0.717] 
-0.003 (0.008) 
[p=0.679] 
-0.003 (0.008) 
[p=0.679] 
Double ethnicity (1=yes) 
0.355 (0.058) 
[p=0.000] 
0.349 (0.081) 
[p=0.000] 
0.349 (0.081) 
[p=0.000] 
0.356 (0.058) 
[p=0.000] 
0.108 (0.129) 
[p=0.403] 
0.108 (0.129) 
[p=0.403] 
Age & age squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ability to speak Bahasa 
national language (1=yes) 
0.031 (0.004) 
[p=0.000] 
-0.001 (0.006) 
[p=0.835] 
-0.001 (0.006) 
[p=0.835] 
0.030 (0.004) 
[p=0.000] 
0.021 (0.009) 
[p=0.024] 
0.021 (0.009) 
[p=0.024] 
Dummies for perceived 
accuracy of respondent’s 
interview answers 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for subjective 
economic well-being 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for employment 
categories 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table B2, ctd. 
Dependent = Intra-individual 
ethnicity change (1=yes) 
Model B2 
Newly married individuals only 
Model B5 
Migrants only 
Model B3 Model B4 Model B6 Model B7 
Dummies for educational 
categories 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interviewer-level control variables       
Interviewer has conducted 
IFLS surveys before 
(1=yes) 
-0.007 (0.003) 
[p=0.017] 
-0.001 (0.004) 
[p=0.862] 
-0.001 (0.004) 
[p=0.862] 
-0.007 (0.003) 
[p=0.019] 
-0.007 (0.009) 
[p=0.438] 
-0.007 (0.009) 
[p=0.438] 
Dummies for ethnicity of 
interviewer  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnic group fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religious group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 27,536 14,295 14,295 27,536 5,953 5,953 
No. of individuals 13,776 9,881 9,881 13,776 4,913 4,913 
Within R2 0.049 0.128 0.128 0.049 0.070 0.070 
Between R2 0.212 0.291 0.291 0.213 0.308 0.308 
Overall R2 0.169 0.267 0.267 0.169 0.275 0.275 
Notes: Table reports estimated linear probabilities. Models B2 and B5 estimate the relationships between marriage and migration and the 
probability of individuals changing their ethnicity. Models B3 and B4 estimate the relationships between interethnic and intra-ethnic marriage 
and the probability of individuals changing their ethnicity restricted to consider only newly married individuals. Models B6 and B7 estimate the 
relationships between interprovincial and intercommunity migration and the probability of individuals changing their ethnicity restricted to a 
sample of migrants. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors and clustered at the individual level. Robust p-values are in square 
brackets. All estimated models include baseline fixed effects to control for time-invariant ethnic group, religious group, community and year-
wave factors. To make the estimates of our coefficients more interpretable, we report the outcomes of the linear probability models only. 
However, logistic models render similar results (available on request). 
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Table B3. Individual fixed effects estimation of factors predicting the likelihood of intra-individual ethnicity change 
Dependent = Intra-individual ethnic identity change 
(1=yes) 
Model B8 Model B9 Model B10 Model B11 
Marriage (1=yes) 
0.001 (0.003) 
[p=0.835] 
- - - 
Interethnic marriage (1=yes) - 
0.097 (0.007) 
[p=0.000] 
- - 
Intra-ethnic marriage (1=yes) - 
-0.017 (0.004) 
[p=0.000] 
- - 
Migration (1=yes) - - 
0.010 (0.004) 
[p=0.029] 
- 
Interprovincial migration (1=yes) - - - 
0.058 (0.014) 
[p=0.000] 
Intercommunity migration (1=yes) - - - 
0.000 (0.004) 
[p=0.924] 
Individual-level control variables      
Ability to speak Bahasa national language 
(1=yes) 
-0.001 (0.005) 
[p=0.814] 
-0.002 (0.005) 
[p=0.620] 
-0.001 (0.005) 
[p=0.788] 
-0.001 (0.005) 
[p=0.824] 
Age and age squared Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for perceived accuracy of 
respondent’s interview answers 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for subjective economic well-being Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for employment status Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interviewer-level control variables     
Dummies for ethnicity of interviewer Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interviewer has conducted IFLS survey before 
(1=yes) 
-0.012 (0.004) 
[p=0.001] 
-0.013 (0.003) 
[p=0.000] 
-0.012 (0.004) 
[p=0.001] 
-0.011 (0.004) 
[p=0.002] 
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnic group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table B3, ctd. 
Dependent = Intra-individual ethnic identity change 
(1=yes) 
Model B8 Model B9 Model B10 Model B11 
No. of observations 27,536 27,536 27,536 27,536 
No. of individuals 13,776 13,776 13,776 13,776 
Within R2 0.099 0.115 0.099 0.102 
Between R2 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.002 
Overall R2 0.005 0.015 0.005 0.006 
Notes: Table reports estimated linear probabilities. Models B8 and B9 estimate the relationship between (intra-ethnic and interethnic) marriage 
and the likelihood of individuals changing their ethnicity. Models B10 and B11 estimate the relationship between (interprovincial and 
intercommunity) migration and the likelihood of individuals changing their ethnicity. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors 
and clustered at the individual level. Robust p-values are in square brackets. All estimated models include baseline fixed effects to control for 
time-invariant ethnic group, community and year-wave factors. Because there are no intra-individual religious conversions, estimated models do 
not include religious group fixed effects. To make the estimates of our coefficients more interpretable, we report the outcomes of the linear 
probability models only. However, logistic models render similar results (available on request). 
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Table B4. Individual random effects estimation of factors predicting the likelihood of intra-individual ethnicity change with parental 
definition of ethnicity 
Dependent = Intra-individual ethnic 
identity change (1=yes) 
Model B12 Model B13 Model B14 Model B15 
Marriage (1=yes) 
-0.001 (0.002) 
[p=0.614] 
- - - 
Interethnic marriage (1=yes) - 
0.083 (0.009) 
[p=0.000] 
- - 
Intra-ethnic marriage (1=yes) - 
-0.020 (0.003) 
[p=0.000] 
- - 
Migration (1=yes) - - 
-0.001 (0.003) 
[p=0.875] 
- 
Interprovincial migration (1=yes) - - - 
0.030 (0.008)  
[p=0.000] 
Intercommunity migration (1=yes) - - - 
-0.008 (0.003) 
[p=0.023] 
Individual-level control variables     
Gender (1=female) 
-0.001 (0.003) 
[p=0.706] 
-0.003 (0.003) 
[p=0.444] 
-0.001 (0.003) 
[p=0.666] 
-0.001 (0.003) 
[p=0.705] 
Double ethnicity (1=yes) 
0.396 (0.068) 
[p=0.000] 
0.390 (0.068) 
[p=0.000] 
0.396 (0.068) 
[p=0.000] 
0.397 (0.067) 
[p=0.000] 
Age & age squared Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ability to speak Bahasa national 
language (1=yes) 
0.010 (0.004) 
[p=0.008] 
0.003 (0.004) 
[p=0.400] 
0.010 (0.004) 
[p-0.008] 
0.009 (0.004) 
[p=0.012] 
Dummies for perceived accuracy of 
respondent’s interview answers 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for subjective economic 
well-being 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for educational 
categories 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for employment 
categories 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table B4, ctd. 
Dependent = Intra-individual ethnic 
identity change (1=yes) 
Model B12 Model B13 Model B14 Model B15 
Interviewer-level control variables    
Dummies for ethnicity of 
interviewer 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interviewer has conducted IFLS 
surveys before (1=yes) 
-0.002 (0.003) 
[p=0.445] 
-0.002 (0.003) 
[p=0.440] 
-0.002 (0.003) 
[p=0.442] 
-0.002 (0.003) 
[p=0.512] 
Year/wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 26,306 26,306 26,306 26,306 
No. of individuals 13,161 13,161 13,161 13,161 
Within R2 0.188 0.177 0.188 0.186 
Between R2 0.193 0.231 0.193 0.196 
Overall R2 0.191 0.219 0.192 0.194 
Notes: Table reports estimated linear probabilities. Models B12 and B13 estimate the relationship between (intra-ethnic and interethnic) marriage 
and the likelihood of individuals changing their ethnicity. Models B14 and B15 estimate the relationship between (inter-provincial and inter-
community) migration and the likelihood of individuals changing their ethnicity. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors and 
clustered at the individual level. Robust p-values are in square brackets. All estimated models include baseline fixed effects to control for time-
invariant ethnic group, community and year-wave factors. Because there are no intra-individual religious conversions, estimated models do not 
include religious group fixed effects (see, also, Table B3). To make the estimates of our coefficients more interpretable, we report the outcomes 
of the linear probability models only. However, logistic models render similar results (available on request). 
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Table B5. Individual linear probability models estimating whether individuals learn the language of their new ethnicity 
Dependent = Learning language of new ethnic identity 
(1=yes) 
Model B16 
Cross-sectional 
Model B17 
Cross-sectional 
Model B18 
Panel 
Intra-individual ethnicity change (1=yes) 
0.734 (0.028) 
[p=0.000] 
0.855 (0.018) 
[p=0.000] 
0.380 (0.112) 
[p=0.002] 
Intra-individual ethnicity change in the previous wave 
(1=yes) 
- 
0.143 (0.028) 
[p=0.000] 
- 
Individual-level control variables     
Gender (1=female) 
0.001 (0.002) 
[p=0.480] 
0.003 (0.004) 
[p=0.427] 
- 
Double ethnicity (1=yes) 
0.106 (0.097) 
[p=0.274] 
0.145 (0.109) 
[p=0.185] 
- 
Age and age squared Yes Yes Yes 
Ability to speak Bahasa national language 
(1=yes) 
0.024 (0.007) 
[p=0.001] 
0.034 (0.011) 
[p=0.003] 
0.818 (0.258) 
[p=0.002] 
Dummies for perceived accuracy of respondent’s 
interview answers 
Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for subjective economic well-being Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for employment status Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for educational categories Yes Yes Yes 
Interviewer-level control variables    
Interviewer has conducted IFLS surveys before 
(1=yes) 
0.001 (0.002) 
[p=0.539] 
-0.004 (0.004) 
[p=0.301] 
0.001 (0.001) 
[p=0.508] 
Dummies for ethnicity of interviewer Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects No No Yes 
Ethnic group fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Religious group fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Year/wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table B5, ctd. 
Dependent = Learning language of new ethnic identity 
(1=yes) 
Model B16 
Cross-sectional 
Model B17 
Cross-sectional 
Model B18 
Panel 
No. of observations 17,933 8,931 17,933 
No. of individuals 10,287 8,931 10,287 
Within R2 x x 0.179 
Between R2 x x 0.020 
Overall R2 0.313 0.384 0.025 
Notes: Table reports estimated linear probabilities. Models B16 estimates the probability of individuals learning the ethnic language of their new 
ethnic group after a change in their ethnicity. Model B17 estimates the probability of individuals learning the ethnic language of their new ethnic 
group with a lag of maximum 7 years after a change in their ethnicity. Model B18 estimates the probability of individuals learning the ethnic 
language of their new ethnicity after a change in their ethnicity with individual fixed effects controlled for. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
robust standard errors and clustered at the individual level. Robust p-values are in square brackets. All regressions include baseline fixed effects 
to control for time-invariant ethnic group, religious group, community and year-wave factors. To make the estimates of our coefficients more 
interpretable, we report the outcomes of the linear probability models only. However, logistic models render similar results (available on 
request). 
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Table C1. Individual logistic analysis estimating the log odds of an individual adopting the ethnic identity of his/her spouse in matrilocal 
vs. non-matrilocal communities 
Dependent = Spousal ethnic adaptation (1=yes) 
Model C1 
Men as reference 
category (Gender = 
1 for women, 0 for 
men) 
Model C2 
Women as 
reference category 
(Gender = 1 for 
men, 0 for women) 
Model C3 
Men as reference 
category (Gender = 
1 for women, 0 for 
men) 
Gender * matrilocal residence norm - 
0.993 (0.382) 
[p=0.009] 
-0.993 (0.382) 
[p=0.009] 
Gender 
0.393 (0.172) 
[p=0.022] 
-0.910 (0.403) 
[p=0.024] 
0.910 (0.403) 
[p=0.024] 
Individual-level control variables    
Ability to speak Bahasa national language (1=yes) 
-0.399 (0.303) 
[p=0.189] 
-0.572 (0.308) 
[p=0.063] 
-0.572 (0.308) 
[p=0.063] 
Educational difference with spouse    
Spouse has same level of education (=reference) 0 0 0 
Spouse has less education 
-0.112 (0.284) 
[p=0.694] 
-0.109 (0.294) 
[p=0.710] 
-0.109 (0.294) 
[p=0.710] 
Spouse has more education 
-0.589 (0.226) 
[p=0.009] 
-0.539 (0.224) 
[p=0.016] 
-0.539 (0.224) 
[p=0.016] 
Individual belongs to community’s ethnic minority before marriage 
(1=yes) 
0.905 (0.684) 
[p=0.186] 
0.896 (0.680) 
[p=0.188] 
0.896 (0.680) 
[p=0.188] 
Dummies for educational categories Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for perceived accuracy of respondent’s interview answers Yes Yes Yes 
Interviewer-level control variables    
Interviewer has conducted IFLS surveys before (1=yes) Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for ethnicity interviewer  Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnic group fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Religious group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year/wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year-community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table C1, ctd. 
Dependent = Spousal ethnic adaptation (1=yes) 
Model C1 
Women as reference 
category (Gender = 
1 for women, 0 for 
men) 
Model C2 
Men as reference 
category (Gender = 
1 for men, 0 for 
women) 
Model C3 
Women as 
reference category 
(Gender = 1 for 
women, 0 for men) 
No. of observations 705 705 705 
No. of clusters (provinces) 14 14 14 
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.314 0.314 
Notes: Sample is restricted to newly intermarried men and women. Table reports estimated log odds. Model C1 estimates the effect of gender 
(1=female) on the likelihood of spousal ethnic adaptation. Models C2 and C3 estimate the effect of the interaction between matrilocal residence 
norms and gender on the likelihood of spousal ethnic adaptation using either men (Model C2) or women (Model C3) as the reference category. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are cluster-robust standard errors. Robust p-values are in square brackets. The estimated model includes baseline 
fixed effects to control for time-invariant ethnic group, religious group, community and year-wave factors. Linear probability models render 
similar results (available on request). 
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Table C2. Individual logistic analysis estimating the log odds of an individual adopting the ethnic identity of his/her spouse measured 
using parental definition of ethnic adaptation 
Dependent = Spousal ethnic adaptation (1=yes) 
Model C4 
Men as reference 
category (Gender = 
1 for women, 0 for 
men) 
Model C5 
Women as reference 
category (Gender = 1 
for men, 0 for 
women) 
Model C6 
Men as reference 
category (Gender = 1 
for women, 0 for 
men) 
Gender * matrilocal residence norm - 
1.15 (0.439) 
[p=0.009] 
-1.15 (0.439) 
[p=0.009] 
Gender  
0.322 (0.198) 
[p=0.104] 
-1.25 (0.510) 
[p=0.014] 
1.25 (0.510) 
[p=0.014] 
Individual-level control variables    
Ability to speak Bahasa national language (1=yes) Yes Yes Yes 
Educational difference spouse     
Spouse has same level of education (reference) Yes Yes Yes 
Spouse has less education Yes Yes Yes 
Spouse has more education Yes Yes Yes 
Individual belongs to community’s ethnic minority before marriage 
(1=yes) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for educational categories Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for perceived accuracy of respondent’s interview answers Yes Yes Yes 
Interviewer-level control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Interviewer has conducted IFLS surveys before (1=yes) Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for ethnicity interviewer  Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnic group fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Religious group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year/wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year-community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 584 584 584 
No. of clusters (provinces) 14 14 14 
Pseudo R2 0.324 0.332 0.332 
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Notes: See Table C1. Sample is restricted to newly intermarried men and women. Table reports estimated log odds. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are cluster-robust standard errors. Robust p-values are in square brackets. The estimated model includes baseline fixed effects to 
control for time-invariant ethnic group, religious group, community and year-wave factors. Linear probability models render similar results 
(available on request). 
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Table C3. Individual logistic analysis estimating the log odds of an individual adopting the ethnicity of his/her spouse with added 
moderating effects 
Dependent = Spousal ethnic adaptation (1=yes) 
Model C7 
Bahasa Indonesia 
as added 
moderator 
Model C8 
Education as 
added moderator 
Model C9 
Educational 
differences 
between 
spouses as 
added 
moderators 
Model C10 
All moderating 
effects 
Gender * matrilocal residence norm 
-1.00 (0.394) 
[p=0.034] 
-0.836 (0.412) 
[p=0.042] 
-0.918 (0.405) 
[p=0.023] 
-0.854 (0.401) 
[p=0.033] 
Gender (1=women) 
1.06 (0.383) 
[p=0.006] 
0.974 (0.390) 
[p=0.013] 
0.996 (0.378) 
[p=0.008] 
0.981 (0.382) 
[p=0.010] 
Additional moderating effects     
Ability to speak Bahasa national language * matrilocal residence 
norm 
Yes No No Yes 
Educational categories * matrilocal residence norm No Yes No Yes 
Educational difference spouse * matrilocal residence norm No No Yes Yes 
Individual-level control variables     
Ability to speak Bahasa national language (1=yes) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Educational difference spouse Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual belongs to community’s ethnic minority before 
marriage (1=yes) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for educational categories Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for perceived accuracy of respondent’s interview 
answers 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interviewer-level control variables     
Interviewer has conducted IFLS surveys before (1=yes) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for ethnicity interviewer  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnic group fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religious group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table C3, ctd. 
Dependent = Spousal ethnic adaptation (1=yes) 
Model C7 
Bahasa Indonesia 
as added 
moderator 
Model C8 
Education as 
added moderator 
Model C9 
Educational 
differences 
between 
spouses as 
added 
moderators 
Model C10 
All moderating 
effects 
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 703 705 705 703 
No. of clusters (provinces) 14 14 14 14 
Pseudo R2 0.315 0.319 0.314 0.323 
Notes: See Table C1. Sample is restricted to newly intermarried men and women. Table reports estimated log odds. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are cluster-robust standard errors. Robust p-values are in square brackets. The estimated model includes baseline fixed effects to 
control for time-invariant ethnic group, religious group, community and year-wave factors. Linear probability models render similar results 
(available on request). 
 
81 
Table D1. Individual random and fixed effects estimation of factors predicting the likelihood of intra-individual racial identity change 
coincidental with (interracial) marriage 
 Married individuals only 
Model D4 
Generic, undirected 
intra-individual racial 
identity change 
Model D5 
Spousal racial 
adaptation (directed 
intra-individual racial 
identity change) 
 
Model D1 
Generic, undirected 
intra-individual racial 
identity change 
Model D2 
Generic, undirected 
intra-individual racial 
identity change 
Model D3 
Spousal racial 
adaptation (directed 
intra-individual racial 
identity change) 
Interracial marriage (1=yes) 
0.204 (0.024) 
[p=0.000] 
- 
0.189 (0.022) 
[p=0.000] 
0.135 (0.018) 
[p=0.000] 
0.141(0.017) 
[p=0.000] 
Intraracial marriage (1=yes) - 
-0.204 (0.024) 
[p=0.000] 
- 
0.000 (0.000) 
[p=0.573] 
- 
Dummies for family income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for educational 
categories 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for household income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age and age squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Racial group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 5,351 5,351 5,336 9,171,406 9,164,433 
No. of individuals 4,684 4,684 4,670 2,300,088 2,299,667 
Within R2 0.149 0.149 0.153 0.019 0.006 
Between R2 0.265 0.265 0.275 0.004 0.000 
Overall R2 0.239 0.239 0.248 0.004 0.000 
Notes: Table reports estimated linear probabilities. Models D1, D2, and D4 estimate the relationship between interracial/intraracial marriage and 
the probability of individuals changing their racial identity. Models D3 and D4 estimate the relationship between interracial/intraracial marriage 
and the probability of individuals adopting their spouse’s racial identity. Models D1-D3 estimate the relationship between interracial/intraracial 
marriage for a restricted sample of newly married individuals whereas models D4 and D5 estimate these effects for the whole sample. All 
regressions include baseline fixed effects to control for time-invariant individual (if possible), racial group, community and year-wave factors. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors and clustered at the individual level. Robust p-values are in square brackets. To make 
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the estimates of our coefficients more interpretable, we report the outcomes of linear probability model only. However, logistic models render 
similar results (available on request). The dependent variables measure whether the individual has changed his/her self-reported racial identity 
(undirected intra-individual racial identity change) or whether the individual has adopted the racial identity of his/her spouse (directed intra-
individual racial identity change). Undirected intra-individual racial identity change is a dummy variable that indicates whether an individual 
changed (=1) or retained (=0) his/her current self-reported race or racial identity in comparison to the individual’s self-reported racial identity in 
the previous wave. The underlying measure of racial group membership is based on the item asking respondents “I am going to read you a list of 
five race categories. You may choose one or more races. For this survey, Hispanic origin is not a race. (Are/Is) (NAME/you) White; Black or 
African American; Pacific Islander, Asian, Indian or Alaska Native; or Native Hawaiian?” Spousal racial adaptation is a dummy variable that 
indicates whether an individual adapted his/her self-reported racial identity to have the same self-reported racial identity as his/her spouse (=1) or 
not (=0). The measure underlying this variable is similar to the dummy variable on undirected intra-individual racial identity change. Interracial 
marriage is a dummy variable that measures whether the individual had a different self-reported racial identity before his/her marriage than the 
self-reported racial identity of his/her spouse after their marriage. Data for the U.S. are from the 2005-2012 Current Population Surveys (Ruggles 
et al. 2019). Based on the results for Model D1, the marginal probability of intra-individual racial identity change among individuals that have 
married a spouse with another racial identity is 20.2% (95%CI: 15.6─24.7%). Based on the results for Model D2, the marginal probability of 
intra-individual racial identity change among individuals that have married a spouse with the same racial identity is -0.19% (95%CI: -
0.59─0.21%). Based on the results for Models D1-D2, the marginal probability of intra-individual racial identity change among all newlyweds is 
1.65% (95%CI: 1.10─2.21%). 
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Table D2. Churning and racial identity switching between major racial groups in the U.S. (in %) 
Former self-reported race→ 
 
Current self-reported race↓ 
(1) White 
(2) Black 
or African 
American 
(3) 
Mixed 
(4) Pacific Islander (5) Asian 
(6) Indian or Alaska 
Native 
(7) Native 
Hawaiian 
(1) White 
[n=10,615,509] 
99.9 0.35 0.63 4.4 0.39 0.64 0.57 
(2) Black or African 
American 
[n=1,346,862] 
0.05 99.6 0.26 0.58 0.08 0.06 0.10 
(3) Mixed 
[n=75,745] 
0.01 0.03 99.0 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.0 
(4) Pacific Islander 
[n=5,149] 
0.00 0.00 0.00 65.5 0.00 0.00 0.0 
(5) Asian 
[628,878] 
0.03 0.03 0.04 27.05 99.5 0.01 0.28 
(6) Indian or Alaska Native 
[n=88,150] 
0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 99.3 0.01 
(7) Native Hawaiian 
[n=56,783] 
0.00 0.00 0.01 2.4 0.02 0.00 99.0 
Total (sum of Rows 1 to 7) 100% 
Notes: Table presents the raw percentages of all individuals in the sample switching to / retaining a specific racial identity, say, White. 
Calculations are based on data from the U.S. Current Population Survey (2008-2018). Individuals’ racial identity is based on the following 
questionnaire item: “I am going to read you a list of five race categories. You may choose one or more races. For this survey, Hispanic origin is 
not a race. (Are/Is) (NAME/you) White; Black or African American; Pacific Islander, Asian, Indian or Alaska Native; or Native Hawaiian?” The 
number of individuals who self-report belonging to a certain racial group is reported in square brackets.  
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Table E1. Individual random effects estimation of factors predicting the likelihood of intra-individual caste identity change coincidental 
with (intercaste) marriage 
 Newly married individuals only 
Model E3 
Generic, undirected 
intra-individual caste 
identity change 
Model E4 
Spousal adaptation 
(directed intra-individual 
caste identity change) 
 Model E1 
Generic, undirected intra-
individual caste identity 
change 
Model E2 
Generic, undirected intra-
individual caste identity 
change 
Intercaste marriage (1=yes) 
0.800 (0.039) 
[p=0.000] 
- 
0.619 (0.040) 
[p=0.000] 
0.643 (0.040) 
[p=0.000] 
Intra-caste marriage (1=yes) - 
-0.800 (0.039) 
[p=0.000] 
-0.155 (0.006) 
[p=0.000] 
- 
Individual-level control variables     
Household below poverty line Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years of educations Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age and age squared Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Caste fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 5,018 5,018 150,851 68,305 
No. of individuals 5,018 5,018 150,851 68,305 
Adjusted R2 0.742 0.742 0.091 0.113 
Notes: Table reports estimated linear probabilities. Models E1, E2, and E3 estimate the relationship between intercaste/intra-caste marriage and 
the probability that an individual changes his/her caste identity. Model E4 estimates the relationship between an intercaste/intra-caste marriage 
and the probability that an individual adopts the caste identity of his/her spouse or not. Models E1 and E2 estimate this relationship for a 
restricted sample of newly married individuals whereas models E3 and E4 estimate this relationship for the whole sample. All regressions 
include baseline fixed effects to control for time-invariant caste, community and year/wave factors. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust 
standard errors. Robust p-values are in square brackets. To make the estimates of our coefficients more interpretable, we report the outcomes of 
linear probability model only. However, logistic models render similar results (available on request). The dependent variables measure whether 
the individual has changed his/her self-reported caste identity (undirected intra-individual caste identity change) or whether the individual has 
adopted the caste identity of his/her spouse (directed intra-individual caste identity change). Undirected intra-individual caste identity change 
(Models E1, E2, and E3) is a dummy variable that indicates whether an individual has changed (=1) or retains (=0) his/her self-reported caste or 
caste identity compared to the individual’s self-reported ethnicity in the previous wave. The underlying measure of caste membership is based on 
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the item asking respondents “Which caste do you belong to?” Spousal adaptation is a dummy variable that indicates whether an individual has 
adapted his/her self-reported caste identity to have the same self-reported caste identity as his/her spouse (=1) or not (=0). Intercaste marriage is a 
dummy variables that indicates whether the individual had a different self-reported caste identity before his/her marriage than the self-reported 
caste identity of his/her spouse after the marriage or whether the individual self-reports to have had an intercaste marriage measured with the 
questionnaire item: “Is your husband’s family the same caste as your natal family?” Data are from the 2005 and 2012 India Human Development 
Survey (IHDS 2005, 2012). Based on the results for Model E1, the marginal probability of intra-individual caste identity change coincidental 
with an intercaste marriage is 77.8% (95%CI: 70.0─85.7%). Based on the results for Model E2, the marginal probability of intra-individual caste 
identity change among individuals that have married a spouse from the same caste is only 1.34% (95%CI: -0.82 ─3.50%) and not statistically 
significant at usual levels. Based on the results for Models E1-E2, the marginal probability of intra-individual caste change among all individuals 
is 22.2% (95%CI: 21.8-22.7%). 
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Table E2. Churning and caste identity switching between main castes in India (in %) 
Former self-reported caste→ 
 
Current self-reported caste↓ 
(1) 
Brahim 
(2) Forward 
caste 
(3) Other 
backward caste 
(4) Dalit (5) Adivasi 
(6) 
Muslim 
(7) Christian, 
Sikh, and Jain 
(1) Brahim 
[n=9,299] 
77.7 14.4 5.09 2.18 0.39 0.03 0.23 
(2) Forward caste 
[n=132,107] 
3.48 69.2 20.7 3.34 1.45 0.56 1.15 
(3) Other backward caste 
[n=60,575] 
1.00 10.9 81.9 3.89 1.59 0.29 0.44 
(4) Dalit 
[n=35,732] 
0.38 2.43 6.42 87.0 2.23 0.93 0.57 
(5) Adivasi 
[n=14,131] 
0.70 1.99 5.15 5.68 85.9 0.42 0.18 
(6) Muslim 
[n=19,635] 
0.03 0.22 0.35 1.03 0.71 97.6 0.12 
(7) Christian, Sikh, and Jain 
[n=5,386] 
0.41 7.52 6.92 8.11 1.42 0.43 75.2 
Total (sum of Rows 1 to 7) 100% 
Notes: Table presents the raw percentages of all individuals in the sample switching to / retaining a specific caste, say, Brahim. Calculations are 
based on data from the India Human Development Survey (2005 & 2012). Individuals’ caste identity is based on the item asking “Which caste do 
you belong to?” The number of individuals who self-report belonging to a certain caste is reported in square brackets. 
 
